This thesis contains two essays on industrial organization, particularly matching and strategic interaction between the players. The first chapter examined the matching in the online platform and focused on how the advertising changes the matching pattern. The last chapter studies matching in the electricity market. In the first chapter, I examined how advertising affects equilibrium prices in an online marketplace by using unique data from a Korean online resale market. The posting frequency in the used market is used as a measure for advertising. Using the posted price, I infer how sellers compete in price using the empirical implications of the \cite{armstrong2020patterns} framework of oligopolistic sellers. The analysis shows that sellers with more frequent listing charge prices with first-order stochastically dominant distributions than sellers who advertise less. Sellers who post less face more elastic demand than the frequent posters, resulting in higher markups for the frequent posters. Repeated posting benefits frequent posters and platforms by increasing the market price and chances of sales but can harm consumer welfare. The second chapter studies matching in the energy market using the case of the power purchase agreement, which is a way of selling and purchasing electricity generated from renewable sources at a fixed price over long periods. This paper investigates the link between wholesale market risk and the equilibrium prices of these contracts. We first present a stylized model of PPA equilibrium to fix intuition on the relationship between PPA prices, wholesale prices, and market volatility. We then test the model predictions using data on all utility-scale wind projects. Results suggest that the mean retail electricity prices and wholesale price volatility positively correlate with PPA prices, whereas the volatility measure does not strongly correlate with the equilibrium price. These findings highlight how the participation of both buyers and sellers would affect equilibrium prices in the PPA market.