This dissertation is a defense of teleology, the view that part of what it is for something to be a belief is for it to be guided by a truth-oriented goal. Teleology is thought to suffer from three shortcomings: (1) it cannot account for all the epistemic reasons we seem to have, (2) it cannot vindicate the claim that true but unjustified beliefs are flawed, and (3) it cannot explain the exclusive role evidence plays in first-person deliberation about what to believe. Chapter 1 offers a brief introduction to teleology. Chapter 2 tackles (1). This is done in two steps. First it is argued that if epistemic reasons are not genuinely normative, then the teleologist can account for all the epistemic reasons we seem to have. Then, it is then argued that epistemic reasons are not genuinely normative. Chapter 3 tackles (2). This is done by showing that if beliefs aim to be non-accidentally true, then unjustified beliefs are flawed. Chapter 4 tackles (3). This is done by arguing that the exclusive role that evidence plays in deliberation has been misunderstood. In deliberation, agents don't exclusively consider the evidence. Rather, agents consider what they take the evidence to be. It is then shown that once this is understood, teleologists can account for the role evidence plays in first-person deliberation about what to believe