While hylomorphism was the de facto metaphysics of material objects during the Medieval Period, it has primarily been met with suspicion and ridicule since the Early Modern Period. However, hylomorphism has undergone a bit of a renaissance in the past two decades. Its proponents argue that accepting a hylomorphic view of objects allows us to resolve some sticky problems in contemporary metaphysics. In my dissertation, I present and evaluate two varieties of hylomorphism on offer today, neo-scholastic hylomorphism and Kathrin Koslicki’s brand of neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism. I argue that neo-scholastic hylomorphism’s view of substance and its postulation of prime matter create more problems than they solve. Moreover, I argue that the reasons neo-scholastic hylomorphists give for these views are resistible. I argue further that Koslicki fails to motivate the acceptance of what she calls the “Neo-Aristotelian Thesis”, the claim that composite objects have formal parts in addition to their material parts. In the final chapter of my dissertation, I revise Koslicki’s manner of restricting composition so that it does not reference the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis. I argue that my revised account works just as well as Koslicki’s. I use this result to argue that we should view the Neo-Aristotelian Thesis with some suspicion. Finally, I clarify the relationship between ontological dependence and metaphysical explanation in order to shed light on the ways in which composite objects depend on their parts.