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Optimality justifications : new foundations for epistemology
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- Summary
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'Optimality Justifications' argues for a renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on optimality justifications, ways of showing that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to a...
'Optimality Justifications' argues for a renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on optimality justifications, ways of showing that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to all accessible alternatives. Gerhard Schurz offers a range of new ideas for epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive science.
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- Creator
- Gerhard Schurz
- Format
- Books
- Language
- English
- Publication
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- Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2024
- Physical Details
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- vii, 316 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
- ISBNs
- 9780198887546, 019888754X, 9780191994777, 0191994774
- OCLC
- on1416701547, on1395538090
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Cover -- Optimality Justifications: New Foundations for Epistemology -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Figures -- List of Symbols -- Introduction -- 1: Knowledge and Justification -- 1.1 The Purpose of Cognition: Knowledge as Justified True Belief -- 1.2 Foundation Theory of Justification and the Enlightenment Programme -- 1.3 From Perfect to Fallible Knowledge: Justification and Error Probabilities -- 1.4 Lucky Knowledge I: The Lottery Problem -- 1.5 Lucky Knowledge II: The Gettier Problem -- 1.6 Résumé: Is Our Intuitive Concept of Knowledge Incoherent?
- 2: Foundation Theory and Its Alternatives: A Critical Discussion -- 2.1 Regress Problem and the Challenge of Scepticism: Problems of Internalist Foundation Theory -- 2.2 Alternative Theories of Justification: An Overview -- 2.3 Coherentism and the Circularity Problem -- 2.4 Externalism and the Accessibility Problem -- 2.5 Dogmatism, Commonsensism, and the Rationality Problem -- 2.6 Non-doxasticismand the Reflection Problem -- 2.7 Positivism and the Reduction Problem -- 2.8 In Search of New Foundations -- 3: Foundation-theoretic Epistemology I: Internalism and Minimal Basis
- 3.1 Epistemic Kinds of Beliefs -- 3.1.1 Analytic vs. synthetic -- 3.1.2 Internal vs. external -- 3.2 Defence of Access-internalism -- 3.3 Minimal Basis I: Introspective Beliefs -- 3.3.1 The gradual boundary of consciousness -- 3.3.2 Reflective nature of focal experiences -- 3.3.3 Memory and language as sources of error -- 3.3.4 Cognitive disfunctions and the question of infallibility -- 3.4 Sellars' Dilemma: From Image to Concept -- 3.5 The Refutation of Direct Realism -- 3.6 Sense Experiences or Rational Intuitions? Justifying Empiricism -- 3.7 Minimal Basis II: Analytic Beliefs
- 3.7.1 Relative apriority and higher-orderjustification -- 3.7.2 Basicality, evidence, and corrigibility -- 4: Foundation-theoretic Epistemology II: Conditional Justification and Non-circularity -- 4.1 Deduction, Induction, and Abduction -- 4.2 Subjective and Objective Probability -- 4.3 Refutation of Circular Reasoning and Justification Nets -- 4.4 Full vs. Partial Justification Circles -- 4.5 Rationality Conditions for First-order Justification -- 5: Foundation-theoretic Epistemology III: Optimality Justifications -- 5.1 Limitations of Reliability Justifications
- 5.2 Optimal Meta-methods as a Solution to the Higher-order Regress Problem -- 5.3 Access-optimality and Dominance: Epistemic Decision and Game Theory -- 5.4 From Optimal Methods to Rational Beliefs: The Optimality Principle -- 5.5 Rationality and the Relation between Epistemic and Practical Values -- 6: Justification of Inductive Reasoning -- 6.1 The Problem of Induction: Solution Attempts and Their Failures -- 6.1.1 Can induction be avoided by deductivism? -- 6.1.2 Is induction rational 'by definition'? -- 6.1.3 Can induction be justified by induction or by assumptions of uniformity?