Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Main Argument in the Wider CEE Context -- 1.1.1 Unprecedented Attack on Press Freedom Since Accession to the EU -- 1.2 Introduction of the Dependent Variable: Levels of Horizontal Accountability -- 1.2.1 Conceptualizing the Axes of the Typology -- 1.2.2 Specification of Actors and Time Frame -- 1.3 Alternative Explanations -- 1.3.1 Strong Civil Society and Whistle Blowers -- 1.3.2 Economic Crises and Advertisement Spending -- 1.3.3 Media Pluralism and Market Competition -- 1.3.4 Regime Change -- 1.3.5 Europeanization -- 1.3.6 Inter-Party Competition -- 1.4 Developing the Argument -- 1.4.1 Definition of Media Capture of Media Capture and Collusion -- 1.4.2 The Principal-Agent Perspective on Party Leadership Selection -- 1.4.3 Explaining Media Capture with Intra-Party Dynamics -- Embedding the Explanation in the Literature -- Three Steps: Rootedness, Contestation and Institutionalization of Rules -- Actor's Resources -- Scope Conditions of the Explanation -- 1.5 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Measurement and Methods of Data Collection -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Case Study Method -- 2.3 Measuring Media Capture -- 2.3.1 Operationalizing Horizontal Accountability -- 2.3.2 Interviews -- Approach: Semi-Structured Interviews -- Sampling of Interviewees -- Time Frame -- Managing the Left-right Divide -- No-Response Issues -- Other Sources of Possible Bias -- Analysis of Interview Data -- 2.3.3 Sentiment Analysis -- Measurement of Media Politicization and Media Bias -- Data Collection -- Availability and Quality of the Archives -- Data Analysis: Slavomjer -- 2.4 Measuring the Independent Variable: Intra-Party Dynamics -- 2.4.1 Dimensions of Intra-Party Accountability -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Bibliography
3 Historical Overview-Establishment of Formal Particularism and the First Transition in the 1990s -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 The General Context of the First Transition -- 3.2.1 Prologue to Democratic Change (1980-1989) -- 3.2.2 The War and the Setup of Presidential-Parliamentarism -- Institutional Level -- Behavioural Level -- 3.2.3 Sweeping Replacement of the Elite -- 3.3 Transition in the Media -- 3.3.1 Putting the Mainstream Media Under State Control -- 3.3.2 Limiting Freedom for the Private Press -- 3.3.3 The HDZ Controls the Judiciary -- 3.3.4 Tudjman Used Formal Particularism to Control the Media -- 3.4 The HDZ Loses Popular Support After 1995 -- 3.4.1 The Moderates and the Hardliners Use the Media for Their Infighting -- 3.4.2 Run-Up to the 2000 Elections -- 3.5 Conclusions -- References -- 4 Ivica Račan and Jadranka Kosor: Steps to Universalism -- 4.1 Ivica Račan, 12.1999-12.2003 -- 4.1.1 The Media Scene at the Outset of the "Second Transformation" -- 4.1.2 The Grupo Contract and Its Impact on the Croatian Media Scene -- Interlinked Media Empires and a "Pacified" Market: Evidence for the Links Between Jutarnji List, Večernji List and Slobodna Dalmacija -- 4.1.3 The Media-Mafia Conglomerate Around Nacional -- 4.1.4 PM Račan: Careful Universalism -- Račan Did Not Tackle the Grupo Cartel and EPH's Role in It -- The New Administration Stopped Formal Particularism -- Developments of Universalism -- 4.1.5 President Mesić and Nacional -- 4.1.6 Summarizing the Roles of Račan and Mesić -- 4.1.7 The Effects of Traditional Drivers -- 4.2 Jadranka Kosor, 07.2009-12.2011 -- 4.2.1 Kosor's Relations to Ninoslav Pavić and EPH -- 4.2.2 The Effects of Traditional Drivers -- 4.3 Conclusions -- References -- 5 Ivo Sanader and Zoran Milanović: Regression to Particularism -- 5.1 Formal and Informal Particularism -- 5.2 Ivo Sanader, 12.2003-07.2009
5.2.1 Capturing Media Using Informal Particularism -- Capturing Novi List -- Colluding with Ninoslav Pavić -- Capturing Journalists: The Case of Helena Puljiz -- Boycotting Media Through Advertisement Oligopolies -- 5.2.2 The Effects of Europeanization -- 5.3 Zoran Milanović, 12.2011-12.2015 -- 5.3.1 Informal Particularism -- Milanović Established a System of Trading Information for Objectivity -- Milanović Uses Informal Particularism in Infighting Over EPH -- 5.3.2 Formal Particularism: Dispensing Rewards and Sanctions via Formal Policies -- Media Harassment Using the Tax Police -- Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement -- Formal Economic Pressures -- 5.3.3 Ivo Josipović 2011-2015: Informal Particularism and Collusion -- Ivo Josipović Tries to Remove "Novosti" from the Market -- The Mainstream Press: Jutarnji and Večernji List -- The Relationship of Josipović and Milanović to the Public Prosecutor Mladen Bajić -- 5.3.4 The Effects of Europeanization -- 5.4 Conclusions -- References -- 6 Quantitative Text Analysis -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Brief Description of Method and Data -- 6.2.1 Method -- 6.2.2 Data -- 6.3 Testing the Hypotheses -- 6.3.1 Media Capture -- Is There Evidence for Media Capture in Election years? -- Who Organizes Media Capture? -- Capture of Public Media -- The Role of So-Called "Untouchables" -- 6.4 Summary of the Reliability Assessment -- 6.4.1 Limitations of Method and Data -- 6.5 Conclusions -- Bibliography -- 7 What Motivated the Shifts Between Particularism and Universalism? -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Summary of the Argument -- 7.3 Rootedness Relaxes the Need for Media Control -- 7.3.1 Summary -- 7.3.2 The Way Račan Acquired Party Leadership -- 7.3.3 Contestation Was Not Personal But Over Ideological Questions -- 7.3.4 Permitted Contestation -- Decentralized the Party and Allowed Factions
7.3.5 Required Comparatively Little Media Support from Pavić -- 7.4 Party-Internal Contestation and the Need to Control Media -- 7.4.1 Jadranka Kosor-Weakly Rooted and Highly Contested -- Jadranka Kosor Is Appointed to Party Leadership -- Kosor Fails to Contain Contestation -- Kosor Tried to Fight Competitors But Was Not Supported by EPH -- 7.4.2 Sanader and Milanović-Controlling Contestation for the Leadership -- Mode of Acquiring Power Within the Party -- The Path of Non-Rooted Politicians-Eliminating Intra-Party Competition -- Eliminating Contestation Allows the Party Leaders to Make Use of Particularism -- 7.5 Conclusions -- References -- 8 Conclusions -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Synthesis of Empirical Findings -- 8.2.1 Shape and Dynamics of Media Capture and Collusion -- (Informal) Universalism 2000-2003 -- Informal Particularism 2004-2009 -- Universalism 2009-2011 -- Formal Particularism 2011-2015 -- 8.2.2 Why Did Traditional Drivers Fail and What Has Been Driving Media Capture Instead? -- 8.3 Theoretical, Conceptual and Methodological Implications -- 8.3.1 Party Leadership Selection -- 8.3.2 Particularism -- 8.3.3 Sentiment Analysis -- 8.4 Policy Implications and Directions for Further Research -- 8.4.1 Better Measures for Media Independence -- 8.4.2 Testing the Intra-Party Competition Hypothesis on a Larger N -- 8.4.3 Empirical Research on Informal Rules -- 8.5 Final Remarks -- References -- Bibliography -- Index