Why Doesn't Society Minimize Central Bank Secrecy?

Author / Creator

Lewis, Karen K

Available as

Online

Summary

Abstract: Societies have incentives to design institutions that allow central bank. Abstract: secrecy. This paper illustrates these incentives in two ways. First, if. Abstract: society tries to con...

Abstract: Societies have incentives to design institutions that allow central bank.

Abstract: secrecy. This paper illustrates these incentives in two ways. First, if.

Abstract: society tries to constrain secrecy in one way, central bankers will try to.

Abstract: regain lost effectiveness by building up secrecy in other ways.

Abstract: Therefore, we may wind up accepting types of secrecy that appear.

Abstract: preventable because reducing them would lead to higher costs. Second, if.

Abstract: the social trade-offs between policy objectives change over time, the.

Abstract: public may directly prefer greater central bank secrecy so that it will be.

Abstract: surprised with expansionary policies when it most desires them.

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