Product Market Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistence

Author / Creator

Abowd, John M

Available as

Online

Summary

Abstract: We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent of. Abstract: organizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regarding. Abstract: resistance to union organi...

Abstract: We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent of.

Abstract: organizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regarding.

Abstract: resistance to union organizing. The central exogenous variable in the.

Abstract: analysis is the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available to be split.

Abstract: between unions and employers.

Abstract: We measure available quasi-rents per worker as the difference per.

Abstract: worker between total industry revenues net of raw materials costs and labor.

Abstract: costs evaluated at the opportunity cost of the workers. Using two-digit.

Abstract: industry level data for thirty-five U.S. industries for the period 1955.

Abstract: through 1986, we find that both organizing activity and employer resistance.

Abstract: to unionization are positively related to available quasi-rents per worker.

Abstract: However, there is still a strong negative trend in union organizing activity.

Abstract: and a strong positive trend in employer resistance after controlling for.

Abstract: quasi-rents per worker. Thus, the explanation for the decline in union.

Abstract: organizing activity and the increase in employer resistance to unionization.

Abstract: since the mid 1970's lies elsewhere.

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