Asymmetric information and sovereign debt : theory meets Mexican data

Author / Creator

Cole, Harold Linh, 1957- author

Available as

Online

Summary

Using a novel data set containing all bids by all bidders for Mexican government bonds from 2001 to 2017, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key determinant of prima...

Using a novel data set containing all bids by all bidders for Mexican government bonds from 2001 to 2017, we demonstrate that asymmetric information about default risk is a key determinant of primary market bond yields. Empirically, large bidders do not pay more for bonds than the average bidder but their bids are accepted more frequently. We construct a model where investors may differ in wealth, risk aversion, market power and information, and find that only heterogeneous information can qualitatively account for these patterns. Moreover, asymmetric information about rare disasters can quantitatively match key moments of bids and yields, both within and across periods.

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