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| LEADER | 02716cam a2200433Ii 4500 | |
| 001 | 991022448018102122 | |
| 005 | 20200331035459.0 | |
| 006 | m o d | |
| 007 | cr ||||||||||| | |
| 008 | 200316s2020 maua ob 000 0 eng d | |
| 035 | $a(OCoLC)1144932667 | |
| 035 | $a(OCoLC)on1144932667 | |
| 035 | $a(EXLNZ-01UWI_NETWORK)9912943722702121 | |
| 040 | $aOUN$beng$erda$cOUN$dGZM | |
| 043 | $as-ck--- | |
| 049 | $aGZMA | |
| 050 | _4 | $aH11$b.N2434x no.26848 |
| 100 | 1_ | $aFergusson, Leopoldo$eauthor. |
| 245 | 14 | $aThe weak state trap /$cLeopoldo Fergusson, Carlos A. Molina, James A. Robinson. |
| 264 | _1 | $aCambridge, Mass. :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$c2020. |
| 300 | $a1 online resource (49 pages) :$billustrations. | |
| 336 | $atext$btxt$2rdacontent | |
| 337 | $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia | |
| 338 | $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier | |
| 490 | 1_ | $aNBER working paper series ;$vno. 26848 |
| 588 | 0_ | $aOnline resource; title from http://www.nber.org/papers/26848 viewed March 16, 2020. |
| 500 | $a"March 2020" | |
| 504 | $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 24-29). | |
| 520 | $aDevelopment outcomes come in "clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to flourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the micro level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing influences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit. | |
| 651 | _0 | $aColombia$xEconomic conditions$y1970-$xEconometric models. |
| 650 | _0 | $aPatronage, Political$zColombia$xEconometric models. |
| 650 | _0 | $aTax evasion$zColombia$xEconometric models. |
| 650 | _0 | $aPolitical corruption$zColombia$xEconometric models. |
| 651 | _0 | $aColombia$xPolitics and government$y1974-$xEconometric models. |
| 700 | 1_ | $aMolina, Carlos A.,$eauthor. |
| 700 | 1_ | $aRobinson, James A.,$d1960-$eauthor. |
| 710 | 2_ | $aNational Bureau of Economic Research,$epublisher. |
| 830 | _0 | $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;$vno. 26848. |
| 856 | 40 | $uhttps://www.nber.org/papers/26848 |