MARC Bibliographic Record

LEADER03447cam a2200493Ii 4500
001 991022374054202122
005 20190430052449.0
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 190425s2019 mauab ob 000 0 eng d
035    $a(OCoLC)1098282392
035    $a(OCoLC)on1098282392
035    $a(EXLNZ-01UWI_NETWORK)9912743688802121
040    $aOUN$beng$erda$cOUN$dGZM
043    $an-us---
049    $aGZMA
050 _4 $aH11$b.N2434x no.25770
100 1_ $aAltig, David,$d1956-$eauthor.
245 10 $aDid the 2017 tax reform discriminate against blue state voters? /$cDavid Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, Patrick C. Higgins, Darryl R. Koehler, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Michael Leiseca, Ellyn Terry, Yifan Ye.
264 _1 $aCambridge, Mass. :$bNational Bureau of Economic Research,$c2019.
300    $a1 online resource (26 pages) :$billustrations, map.
336    $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337    $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338    $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1_ $aNBER working paper series ;$vno. 25770
588 0_ $aOnline resource; title from http://www.nber.org/papers/25770 viewed April 25, 2019.
500    $a"April 2019"
504    $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 23-25).
520    $aThe Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) made significant changes to corporate and personal federal income taxation, including limiting the SALT (state and local property, income and sales taxes) deductibility to $10,000. States with high SALT tend to vote Democratic. This paper estimates the differential effect of the TCJA on red- and blue-state taxpayers and investigates the importance of the SALT limitation to this differential. We calculate the effect of permanent implementation of the TCJA on households using The Fiscal Analyzer: a life-cycle, consumption-smoothing program incorporating all major federal and state fiscal policies. We find that the average percentage increase in remaining lifetime spending under the TCJA is 1.6 percent in red states versus 1.3 percent in blue states. Among the richest 10 percent of households, this differential is larger. Rich households in red states enjoyed a 2.0 percent increase compared to a 1.2 percent increase among the rich in blue-state households. This gap is driven almost entirely by the limitation on the SALT deduction. Excluding the SALT limitation from the TCJA results in a spending gain of 2.6 percent for rich red-state households compared to 2.7 percent for rich blue-state households.
650 _0 $aTaxation$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xEconometric models.
650 _0 $aCorporations$xTaxation$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xEconometric models.
650 _0 $aIncome tax deductions$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xEconometric models.
650 _0 $aTaxation, State$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xEconometric models.
650 _0 $aLocal taxation$xPolitical aspects$zUnited States$xEconometric models.
610 10 $aUnited States.$tTax Cuts and Jobs Act$xPolitical aspects$xEconometric models.
700 1_ $aHiggins, Patrick C.,$eauthor.
700 1_ $aKoehn, Daryl,$d1955-$eauthor.
700 1_ $aKotlikoff, Laurence J.,$eauthor.
700 1_ $aLeiseca, Michael,$eauthor.
700 1_ $aTerry, Ellyn,$eauthor.
700 1_ $aYe, Yifan,$eauthor.
710 2_ $aNational Bureau of Economic Research,$epublisher.
830 _0 $aWorking paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) ;$vno. 25770.
856 40 $uhttp://www.nber.org/papers/w25770

MMS IDs

Document ID: 9912743688802121
Network Electronic IDs: 9912743688802121
Network Physical IDs:
mms_mad_ids: 991022374054202122