""COVER""; ""TABLE OF CONTENTS""; ""LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS""; ""DEFENDING FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: AN INTRODUCTION""; ""PART I: PERSPECTIVES ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS LITIGATION""; ""CHAPTER 1: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES""; ""1.1 INTRODUCTION""; ""1.2 JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY""; ""1.3 THE LIMITS OF LEGAL LIBERALISM""; ""1.4 POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM""; ""1.5 THE REGIME POLITICS PERSPECTIVE""; ""1.6 HUMAN RIGHTS AS DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE""; ""CHAPTER 2: THE POST-9/11 ROLE OF THE US SUPREME COURT""
""2.1 FIRST STEPS: RASUL AND HAMDI""""2.2 LESSONS FROM HISTORY""; ""2.3 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS""; ""2.4 POSTSCRIPT""; ""CHAPTER 3: LITTLE SISTERS V. BIG BROTHER: A BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACCOUNT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE INVOLVING CENSORSHIP BY CANADA CUSTOMS AND A GAY AND LESBIAN BOOKSTORE""; ""CHAPTER 4: HATE SPEECH LITIGATION IN RUSSIA""; ""4.1 THE PROHIBITION OF HATE SPEECH IN RUSSIA: AN ANTI-EXTREMISM PARADIGM""; ""4.2 RUSSIAN LEGAL PRACTICE: TRENDS IN LIGHT OF CASES IN CASES CONCERNING RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS HATRED""; ""4.3 INCITEMENT AGAINST “SOCIAL GROUPS� IN HATE SPEECH CASES""
""4.4 THE ROLE OF EXPERT OPINIONS IN HATE SPEECH CASES""""4.5 CONCLUSION""; ""CHAPTER 5: REFLECTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH AND BOERNE V. FLORES AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGAL ACADEMY AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ""; ""5.1 EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V. SMITH AND FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE""; ""5.2 BOERNE V. FLORES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER""; ""5.3 CONCLUSION ""; ""PART II PERSPECTIVES ON THE JUDICIARY""; ""CHAPTER 6: JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS TO SUPREME COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: WHAT DO WE SEE AND WHAT ARE WE FATED TO MISS?""
""6.1 PRELIMINARIES ON DESIGNING JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT SCHEMES""""6.2 BASIC MODELS OF JUDICIAL NOMINATION AND APPOINTMENT SYSTEMS""; ""6.3 FREQUENTLY VOICED CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT REVISITED""; ""6.4 FACTORS SHAPING COURTS AND THEIR JURISPRUDENCE, BUT LESS RELEVANT TO APPOINTMENT POWERS PER SE""; ""6.5 CLOSING REMARKS: WHY BOTHER ABOUT APPOINTMENT POWERS?""; ""CHAPTER 7: IMPOSSIBLE ARGUMENTS""; ""7.1 A DEPRESSIVE STARTING POINT""; ""7.2 AUTHORITARIAN LEGAL CULTURE AND ORGANIZATION""; ""7.3 JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE CRITICAL FOUNDATION OF JUDICIAL ARGUMENTS""
""7.4 THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL REFORM""""7.5 LEGAL ARGUMENTS: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE CONSTITUTION, BASIC RIGHTS, AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR STRATEGIC LITIGATION""; ""7.6 CONCLUSION""; ""CHAPTER 8: TAKING THE SKELETON OUT OF THE CLOSET: THE STORY OF THE ASSESSORS� CASE THAT REBUILT THE POLISH JUSTICE SYSTEM""; ""8.1 INTRODUCTION""; ""8.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTION OF “ASSESSOR�""; ""8.3 CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ASSESSORS""; ""8.4 WAITING FOR THE JUDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT""; ""8.5 JUDGMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT""; ""8.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDGMENT""