MARC Bibliographic Record

LEADER02383nam a2200385Ki 4500
001 991022073612502122
005 20151221015501.0
006 m o d
007 cr |||||||||||
008 151210s2015 enka ob 000 0 eng d
035    $a(OCoLC)932015245
035    $a(OCoLC)ocn932015245
035    $a(EXLNZ-01UWI_NETWORK)9911614745602121
040    $aGZM$beng$erda$cGZM$dGZM
049    $aGZMA
100 1_ $aBijlsma, Michiel,$eauthor.
245 10 $aCommunity rating in health insurance :$btrade-off between coverage and selection /$cMichiel Bijlsma, Jan Boone and Gijsbert Zwart.
264 _1 $aLondon :$bCentre for Economic Policy Research,$c2015.
300    $a1 online resource (36 pages) :$billustrations.
336    $atext$btxt$2rdacontent
337    $acomputer$bc$2rdamedia
338    $aonline resource$bcr$2rdacarrier
490 1_ $aDiscussion paper series,$x0265-8003 ;$vno. 10943$aIndustrial organization$aPublic economics
588    $aDescription based on online resource; title from http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10943 viewed December 10, 2015.
500    $a"November 2015"
500    $a"Submitted 14 November 2015."
504    $aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 23-25).
520    $aWe analyze the role of community rating in the optimal design of a risk adjustment scheme in competitive health insurance markets when insurers have better information on their customers' risk profiles than the sponsor of health insurance. The sponsor offers insurers a menu of risk adjustment schemes to elicit this information. The optimal scheme includes a voluntary reinsurance option. Additionally, the scheme should sometimes be complemented by a community rating requirement. The resulting inefficient coverage of low-cost types lowers the sponsor's cost of separating different insurer types. This allows the sponsor to redistribute more rents from low-cost to high-cost consumers.
650 _0 $aHealth insurance$xEconometric models.
650 _0 $aRisk (Insurance)$xEconometric models.
700 1_ $aBoone, Jan,$eauthor.
700 1_ $aZwart, Gijsbert,$eauthor.
710 2_ $aCentre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain),$epublisher.
830 _0 $aDiscussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)) ;$vno. 10943.
856 40 $uhttp://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10943
997    $aMARCIVE

MMS IDs

Document ID: 9911614745602121
Network Electronic IDs: 9911614745602121
Network Physical IDs:
mms_mad_ids: 991022073612502122