Above a swamp : a theory of high-quality scientific production

Author / Creator

Kiri, Bralind, author

Available as

Online

Summary

Building on previous research to reinforce findings or point out limitations is essential for a healthy working of the scientific community because it allows science to self-correct and evolve, thu...

Building on previous research to reinforce findings or point out limitations is essential for a healthy working of the scientific community because it allows science to self-correct and evolve, thus providing a more solid knowledge base to individuals, firms and societies. In this paper we propose a model to investigate the incentives of scientists to perform these activities of control and criticism when these activities, just like the production of high-quality research in the first place, are costly, and we study the strategic interaction among these incentives. We show that a certain fraction of low-quality scientific knowledge characterizes all the equilibria in the basic version of model. In fact, the absence of (detected) low-quality research in a field can be interpreted as the lack of verification activities and thus as a potential limitation to the reliability of that field. We also derive that facilitating incremental research and verification activities improves the expected quality of newly produced knowledge; this effect, however, is contrasted by the incentives to free ride on performing verification if many scientists are involved in it, and also might discourage scientists to undertake new research in the first place. Finally, the findings imply that softening overall incentives to publish does not enhance research quality, although it increases the fraction of low-quality papers that are identified. We also elaborate empirical predictions from the model and strategies to test them, and discuss the implications for firms and investors as they "scout" the scientific landscape.

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