Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-235) and index.
English
Cover -- ROLLING THE IRON DICE -- Contents -- Preface -- NOTES -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- WHAT IS A HISTORICAL ANALOGY? -- TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- THE DECISION TO USE HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- THE RETRIEVAL OF SPECIFIC HISTORICAL INFORMATION -- FUNCTIONS OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION AND ANALOGICAL REASONING -- DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION OR JUSTIFICATION? -- MAPPING -- GROUP DISCUSSION -- THE EFFECT OF HISTORY -- HISTORY: THE UNCERTAIN GUIDE -- REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES AND THE USE OF FORCE -- THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NOT A LAST RESORT -- NOTES -- PART I INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES AND THE USE OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION -- 2 The Leaders -- THE BRITISH -- Clement Attlee -- Ernest Bevin -- Winston Churchill -- Anthony Eden -- Harold Macmillan -- Selwyn Lloyd -- THE AMERICANS -- Harry S. Truman -- Dean Acheson -- Dwight D. Eisenhower -- John F. Dulles -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- PART II SITUATIONAL VARIABLES AND THE USE OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION -- 3 The Toughest Decision: Korea -- THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH RESPONSES -- LESSONS FROM HISTORY -- THE USE OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- RETRIEVAL AND TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- THE PROCESS OF DRAWING LESSONS FROM HISTORY -- OTHER POSSIBLE HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 4 A Twisted Tail: The Iranian Oil Nationalization Crisis -- THE CRISIS AND WESTERN GOALS -- A DIVIDED CABINET: THE BRITISH DECISION NOT TO USE MILITARY FORCE -- BRITISH ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY FORCE -- U.S. DECISION MAKING -- MOSSADEGH'S RATIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE -- HISTORICAL INFORMATION -- THE PRESENT AND THE PAST -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 5 A Madman Brandishing an Axe: Suez -- WAS NASSER ANOTHER MUSSOLINI? -- WHY DID EDEN RELY ON HISTORY? -- THE PROCESS OF DRAWING LESSONS FROM HISTORY -- THE EFFECT OF THE 1930s -- FORCE: THE PREFERRED OPTION -- THE TERRIBLE PROBLEM: U.S. OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE
TYPES OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- LESSONS -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 6 Indirect Aggression: Lebanon and Jordan -- THREE CRISES AND AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOALS -- THE MAY DECISION -- WHY MILITARY FORCE? -- THE MAY CRISIS SUBSIDES -- THE JUNE CRISIS -- THE JULY CRISIS -- THE USE OF FORCE -- HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- CONDITIONS THAT INFLUENCED THE USE OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- PROCESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING -- LESSONS -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- 7 Conclusion -- SITUATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES -- CHARACTERISTICS OF HISTORICAL ANALOGIES -- DIAGNOSIS AND PRESCRIPTION OR JUSTIFICATION -- THE PROCESS OF ANALOGICAL REASONING FROM HISTORY -- EFFECT OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON DECISION MAKING -- THE 1930s: HITLER'S SHADOW -- HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND LEARNING -- THE DECISION TO USE MILITARY FORCE -- AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY -- CONCLUSION -- NOTES -- Bibliography -- THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES -- Articles -- Books -- ANALOGICAL REASONING -- Articles -- Books -- KOREA -- Primary Sources -- Books -- Secondary Sources -- Books -- IRAN -- Primary Sources -- Books -- Secondary Sources -- Articles -- Books -- SUEZ -- PRIMARY SOURCES -- Books -- Secondary Sources -- Articles -- Books -- LEBANON/JORDAN -- Primary Sources -- Books -- Secondary Sources -- Articles -- Books -- LEARNING -- Articles -- Books -- Index -- About the Author