Three challenges to moral realism : evolution, disagreement, and moral semantics

Author / Creator

Horn, Justin, dissertant

Available as

Online

Physical

Summary

According to the philosophical position known as moral realism, morality is a robustly objective domain of fact about which many of us have justified beliefs. This dissertation consists of three pa...

According to the philosophical position known as moral realism, morality is a robustly objective domain of fact about which many of us have justified beliefs. This dissertation consists of three papers, each of which presents an independent line of argument against this position. In the first paper, I examine Sharon Street's "Darwinian Dilemma," which claims that realists can give no adequate account of the relation between the (supposed) objective moral truths and the evolutionary pressures that have influenced our moral judgments. I develop a general strategy for constructing a realist response that avoids both horns of Street's dilemma. Then, I argue that while such a response escapes the specific critique presented by Street, it fails to adequately rescue moral realism from the epistemological challenges raised by the (putative) fact of widespread evolutionary influence. In the second paper, I consider whether widespread, intractable moral disagreement raises an additional epistemological challenge for moral realists. First, I isolate exactly what sort of disagreement would pose the most serious threat to justified beliefs about objective moral truths, and develop an account of such fundamental disagreements. Next, I examine several popular anti-realist arguments from disagreement, and argue that they fail to undermine the realist position. Finally, I develop a novel argument for the claim that moral disagreement of a particular sort would undermine our ability to attain justified beliefs about objective moral facts. In the final paper, I once again explore the implications of widespread ethical disagreement, but this time through the lens of moral semantics. Realists hold that moral terms such as "good" and "right" refer to objective moral properties, and that different parties to serious moral disputes refer to the same properties as one another when they use these words. I argue that we have excellent reason to doubt that co-reference obtains in cases of fundamental disagreement. The semantic challenge, if successful, undermines the realist's contention that there is a distinct moral reality that we are all attempting to accurately describe when we engage in moral thought and discourse.

Show More