Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI Available via World Wide Web.
Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- About the Author -- List of Figures -- Convention -- Quotations -- 1 Overbalancing as a Systemic Pathology -- The Phenomenon of Overbalancing -- Why Did Japan Rush to the Pacific War? -- The Argument -- Overview -- 2 Explaining Japan's Rush to the Pacific War -- Neorealism, Neoclassical Realism and Overbalancing -- Neorealism and Overbalancing -- Neoclassical Realism as a Complement to Neorealism -- Neoclassical Realism, Domestic Factors and Identity Crisis -- Putting Neoclassical Realism Back on Track
Mechanism of Contextual Adaption, Threat Perception and Overbalancing -- The Foreign Policy Executive and Its Advisors -- The Mechanism of Contextual Adaption -- Exogenous Shocks and Threat Perception -- The Political Construction of Threat Perception -- The Biases of the Military Institution -- The Structure of Civil-Military Relations -- Scope Condition and Paradigmatic Boundaries -- 3 Appropriate Balancing in the Naval Arms Control Era, 1920-1931 -- Improving Threat Perception: Making Peace with the International Community -- Tense Japan-United States Relations in the Early Twentieth Century
Competing Naval Expansions Before the Washington Conference -- Japan and the League of Nations -- The League of Nations and Arms Control -- Prelude to the Washington Conference -- The Washington Conference -- Japanese Reactions to the Washington Conference -- Appropriate Balancing and International Cooperation During the 1920s and Early 1930s -- Japanese Restraint Toward China -- From Washington to the Geneva Conference -- The Geneva Conference and Its Aftermath -- Prelude to the London Conference -- The London Conference -- Japanese Reactions to the London Conference
4 The Manchurian Crisis as an Exogenous Shock, 1931-1933 -- Exogenous Shock: The Manchurian Crisis -- The Mukden Incident and Its Aftermath -- From Manchuria to Shanghai, and Back Again -- The Settlement of the Manchurian Crisis -- American Restraint During the Manchurian Crisis -- American Naval Expansion in the First Half of the 1930s -- The Construction of Threat Perception Through Securitization -- Secondary Audience: Socio-economic Background -- Secondary Audience: Ideological Background -- The Army's Securitizing Efforts -- The Navy's Securitizing Efforts
Primary Audience: Finance and Foreign Ministries -- Primary Audience: Military Pressure on the Government -- 5 Overbalancing and Japan's Rush to the Pacific War, 1933-1941 -- Inflated Threat Perception and the End of Naval Arms Control -- The Navy's Internal Unity Against Arms Control -- Struggle Over Threat Perception: Drafting Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan -- Inflated Threat Perception and the Abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty -- Preparatory Talks for the Second London Conference -- The Failure of the Second London Conference -- Overbalancing Through Naval Expansion