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OFFICIAL O58 ONLY SéouL FE #-

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF LIMETS VA STTUATIONS IN EAST ASIA
(Off-the-Record Speach delivered at Korean National De~
fense College May 73, 196) by Marshall Green, Deputy
Chief of ?fiission, American Embassy, Seoul., Korea)

General Choe, Members of the Facul"y and Studant Body of the Korean National
Defense College:

Tt 4s an honor ani a priviege to be with you today, for I know the
witel role which the officers /. am now facing will play in the Free World.
Many countries have come to recogni.ze the importance of a National Defense
College, not only in its rask of educating tomorrow's leaders in political-
military affairs, but als. in serving as a moans to educate government officials
generally in the importen, relitiouships betvsen things military, political,
@coromie and social, in ovder that the combined resources of a nation may be
orgenized to the best effact. + is significant that India is right now ore
ganizing a National Defense College and that Burma, under Ne Win, organized
4 National Defense College: a few me nths ago. India and Burma are coming to
have a clearer understanding oj” the challeng: they face from Communism and are
preparing to meet that challenges.

I am requesting that my renarks be rogarded as confidential and 1
now that vou will treat them secordingly, = also wish to stress that what
t have to say ere my Own? Vlews, not necessarily those of my Govermment ,

As for the general setiing of my -eomarks, 1 refer to Ambassador Mc-~
Gonaughy’s speech before “he Netions Defense College on January 4 of this
veer in which he deserilbed the general Par Eastern gituation and outlined our
solicies to meet that shuaticn. You will, perhaps recall that, in terms of
wlitical-military matters, the Ar assado” stressed two things: the first was
“he importance of maintai. ing <. po. icy of :ieaness against Communist force and
hreats and the second was mair taining a eapability to deter and cope with
‘aree and threats.

T+ is ebsolutely certain, 7. bolieve, that, if we were tofall back in
she face of any threats or utilization of encay force, that would merely con-
irm the wulers of the Commnist b..o¢ in the belief that they are in 2 position
+o threaten anywhere and %o corpel follbacks everywhere. Not only would this
qneourage Comunist sggressiver ess, but it would enhance the likelihood of
var, Clearly, it is better to moet. any Communist military nove, even the
slightest enem, probs, at the very outset ravber than later on when friends get.
discouraged anc. the snemy ences raged, overconfident and miscalculating.

I am nct suggesting an unwillingness on our part to discuss issues with
the Communists or to reach settlements based on negotiation and compromise. Tras

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