CONFIDENT IAL

Possibility of ROK Military Attack Against North Korea

It does not-appear likely from the information presently available te the
Department of State that the Korean military government is contemplating an
attack against north Korea. The military government is still in a process of
stabilizing its power within the military establishment as well as in the
nation generally. Its leaders at present appear more preoccupied in maintaining

, 4#heir positions of power in the ROK Government and drawing up policies te

 

 

attack the social and economtc-preblems.of the Republic. Moreoyer, there are
indications that the military regime plans to remove a large group of officers _
from the ROK Army in the near future. Estimates of the number vary greatly
within a range of 1500 to 5000. in addition to officers many NCO's are alse
scheduled for release. United Nations Command representatives have been
advised that the officers designated fer release will be those involved in
politics, financial malpractices, and those deemed inefficient. While the
effect of such a purge on military capabilities is difficult to assess, it
appears unlikely that the military regime would take such steps to remove many
known and capable conbat officers if plans to attack north Korea were contem-
plated at this time.

Moreover, despite the weakening of command relationships, the United Nations
Commend still maintains certain controls over the ROK military and especially
over its logistic base. ROK military leaders are quick to acknowledge that
without full U. S. support any south Korean attack would be doomed to failure.
Although the ROK could conceivably stage border incidents in an attempt to place
the onus of attack on north Korea, the presence of U. 5. forces along the most
sensitive sector of the DM, and of U,. S. military advisers within the ROK
combat units, decrease the likelihood of the success of such plans. Their
attractiveness to the military leadership in terms of diverting attention from
domestic problems or of securing populer unity, is therefore not believed \/
sufficient to motivate provocation of hostilities at least for the present.

The sbove should not be construed as totally discounting the pessibility
of the ROK Government attempting to stage some action which might bring about
the renewal of the Korean conflict. The probability of such action would
increase if the present military regime is unable to cope with the economic \
oroblems ef south Korea and felt the need for military adventures to solidity V
their control over the ROK Government and divert public attention from their
failures in the political, economic and social fields. Our representatives
and advisers in Korea are fully aware of this possibility and American military
commanders remain especially observant for any indications that the ROK mili-
tary regime would undertake through one means or another to re-inaugurate
hestilities in Korea.

In addition if any members of the military government were contemplating
an adventwristic pelicy with regard to north Korea, the recently signed north
Korean-Soviet and north Korean-Chinese Commnist mutual defense treaties may

act

CONFIDENTIAL