L CONF IDEN TIAL

 

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difficulty, of course, was the lack of understanding of the basic differences
between the Republic of Korea and the north Korean regime, and of the history
of the Korean issue, among the newer members of the United Nations. It would
appear that the only useful means of combatting the danger of an affirmative
vote on seating north Korea would be to endeavor to increase the understanding
of the issue among guch delegations. Mr. Dexter suggested that perhaps our
delegations at the UN might profitably concentrate on discussing this issue
with such delegations. I agreed, but pointed out the possible counter=productive
effect of too enthusiastic support of the ROK on the part of countries clearly
identified with the West, and suggested that to the extent we could encourage
such activity by other Free World nations, the results might be even better.
Mr. Dexter agreed.

Mr. Dexter also inquired whether we had given any further thought to
pos sible alternative formlae for the unification of Korea. IL reaffirmed ouf
established position on this question, pointing out the danger of any change
of position which might be interpreted as weakness in the face of Commnist
truculence, but said I believed, speaking personally, that no possibility should
be overlooked which might be profitably considered in the light of the atmosphere
prevailing in the General Assemb the time of debate on Korea -- bearing
always in mind the necessity for preserving the essential principle of UN
competence and unification in freedoms