CONF IDENT IAL

-2- 2916, June 12, 9 p.m., from Ankara (SECTION ONE OF TWO) .
Corrected copy.

press, and impact Korea.

Sarper said almost without emphasis he would take up matter
with General Gursel but did not say he would support our
ideas (as he had asked me support this when he requested me
Saturday June 2 inform USG of Turk "proposal"). I told him
both Washington and I would appreciate his doing 80.

We went over matter again: both us were serious. This time
I again said it would be appreciated if he would take it up
with Gursel. I added it would be helpful, case Gursel
confirmed his decision not send Korean Brigade, know if this
permanent or temporary policy change.,

We talked further with me trying emphasize strongly reasons for
sending full brigade and Sarper stressing views which I felt

he had been told to present. I tried find out what was

really behind decision because Sarper said Department had

not understood "internal security" basis this military
decision. I then recapped reasons that he had given me June

2. He said yes, but there was more than that.

PGOT now has information USSR already working amongst Kurds,
that while nothing serious developed thus far and Kurds proving
unresponsive, it still duty authorities ''to foresee" in
governing, and this PGOT trying do.

I asked Sarper if this GPOT decision went back to RPP original
opposition sending troops Korea. He took an ashtray, moved it
on table and said, ''this government would not so much as move
an ashtray for the RPPs or for the DPS: it is running this
government'"'. I did not accept this as being entire truth

but I said nothing.

 

 

Sarper then asked his Chef de Cabinet Korkut find out whether
Gursel could see him. Ina few minutes Korkut came back
saying Gursel

CONFIDENTIAL