614 A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES I 
 
other words, the bulk of the main body of the army with the king was lost
either by death or capture. Knights fared better than the foot, not only
in escaping injury, but in receiving better treatment as captives. No code
of chivalry or hope of ransom money protected the lowly-born. With the exception
of Reginald of Kerak, whom Saladin executed with his own hand as he had promised,
and t~ rohiuldLedilemplarsa]dHospitallerswhom he ordered ~QJ1eexeGut.ed,
the captive knights were honorabl~?ë~ft1V1~ny were later released, usually
in return for the cession of a castle or town. The foot-soldiers, on the
other hand, and presumably also the mounted sergeants, who escaped the slaughter,
were taken away and sold into slavery by individual Moslem soldiers. Sometimes
thirty or forty were seen tied together by rope. Reports of a glut in the
slave markets of Syria further illustrate the extent of the debacle. A significant
observation made by one Moslem chronicler gives further evidence that the
separation of the infantry from the cavalry had been decisive. He noticed
that although scarcely a horse was left alive, few of the heavily armed knights
were injured.19 These well protected warriors were made helpless by the loss
of their mounts and were easily captured. 
 Since the failure of the infantry seems to have been due as much to their
thirst and exhaustion as to the Moslem attacks, it should again be emphasized
that this great and decisive battle should have been either avoided or fought
under circumstances unfavorable to Saladin. A formidable Christian army,
skilled in Leyantine tactics and hardened by campaigns, had permitted itself
to be maneuvered into a trap largely because of personal and political animosities.
The irreparable blunder of the march across the arid _plateau toward Tiberias
was the direct consequence of Gerard's hatred and suspicion of Raymond and
hi&haneful influence over king Guy. It is perhaps idle to speculate on
what might have been; yet it seems clear that if there had been no party
dissension in Jerusalem there might well have been no Hattin. But now the
disasters which followed were the unavoidable consequences of a major defeat.

 The far-reaching consequences of Hattin must be considered from two points
of view. First, Saladin's victory led directly to the conquest of the greater
part of the three Latin states, although not all this was permanent. Second,
the replacement of Christian by Moslem rule wrought profound changes in the
religious, soci?l, and economic life of the former Christian territories.
It has seemed 
' ~ Cf. abU-Shãmah (RHC, Or., IV), pp. 271—273, 288—289.