COMMENTARIES, 8 NOVEMBER 1787

all power can be safely lodged; and a little attention to the parts of the
one proposed will make it appear very evident, that all the powers
proposed to be lodged in it, will not be then well deposited, either for
the purposes of government, or the preservation of liberty. I will sup-
pose no abuse of powers in those cases, in which the abuse of it is not
well guarded against-I will suppose the words authorising the general
government to regulate the elections of its own members struck out of
the plan, or free district elections, in each state, amply secured.-That
the small representation provided for shall be as fair and equal as it is
capable of being made-I will suppose the judicial department regu-
lated on pure principles, by future laws, as far as it can be by the con-
stitution, and consist with the situation of the country-still there will
be an unreasonable accumulation of powers in the general govern-
ment, if all be granted, enumerated in the plan proposed. The plan
does not present a well balanced government: The senatorial branch
of the legislative and the executive are substantially united, and the
president, or the first executive magistrate, may aid the senatorial in-
terest when weakest, but never can effectually support the democratic,
however it may be oppressed;-the excellency, in my mind, of a well
balanced government is that it consists of distinct branches, each suf-
ficiently strong and independant to keep its own station, and to aid
either of the other branches which may occasionally want aid.
The convention found that any but a small house of representatives
would be expensive, and that it would be impracticable to assemble a
large number of representatives. Not only the determination of the
convention in this case, but the situation of the states, proves the im-
practicability of collecting, in any one point, a proper representation.
The formation of the senate, and the smallness of the house, being,
therefore, the result of our situation, and the actual state of things, the
evils which may attend the exercise of many powers in this national
government may be considered as without a remedy.
All officers are impeachable before the senate only-before the men
by whom they are appointed, or who are consenting to the appoint-
ment of these officers. No judgment of conviction, on an impeachment,
can be given unless two thirds of the senators agree. Under these cir-
cumstances the right of impeachment, in the house, can be of but little
importance: the house cannot expect often to convict the offender;
and, therefore, probably, will but seldom or never exercise the right.
In addition to the insecurity and inconveniences attending this organ-
ization beforementioned, it may be observed, that it is extremely dif-
ficult to secure the people against the fatal effects of corruption and

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