COMMENTARIES, 8 NOVEMBER 1787

excise, duties on all written instruments, &c. may fix themselves on
every person and species of property in the community; they may be
carried to any lengths, and in proportion as they are extended, nu-
merous officers must be employed to assess them, and to enforce the
collection of them. In the United Netherlands the general government
has compleat powers, as to external taxation; but as to internal taxes,
it makes requisitions on the provinces. Internal taxation in this country
is more important, as the country is so very extensive. As many assessors
and collectors of federal taxes will be above three hundred miles from
the seat of the federal government as will be less. Besides, to lay and
collect internal taxes, in this extensive country, must require a great
number of congressional ordinances, immediately operating upon the
body of the people; these must continually interfere with the state laws,
and thereby produce disorder and general dissatisfaction, till the one
system of laws or the other, operating upon the same subjects, shall be
abolished. These ordinances alone, to say nothing of those respecting
the militia, coin, commerce, federal judiciary, &c. &c. will probably
soon defeat the operations of the state laws and governments.
Should the general government think it politic, as some administra-
tions (if not all) probably will, to look for a support in a system of
influence, the government will take every occasion to multiply laws,
and officers to execute them, considering these as so many necessary
props for its own support. Should this system of policy be adopted,
taxes more productive than the impost duties will, probably, be wanted
to support the government, and to discharge foreign demands, without
leaving any thing for the domestic creditors. The internal sources of
taxation then must be called into operation, and internal tax laws and
federal assessors and collectors spread over this immense country. All
these circumstances considered, is it wise, prudent, or safe, to vest the
powers of laying and collecting internal taxes in the general govern-
ment, while imperfectly organized and inadequate; and to trust to
amending it hereafter, and making it adequate to this purpose? It is
not only unsafe but absurd to lodge power in a government before it
is fitted to receive it? It is confessed that this power and representation
ought to go together. Why give the power first? Why give the power to
the few, who, when possessed of it, may have address enough to prevent
the increase of representation? Why not keep the power, and, when
necessary, amend the constitution, and add to its other parts this power,
and a proper increase of representation at the same time? Then men
who may want the power will be under strong inducements to let in
the people, by their representatives, into the government, to hold their

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