COMMENTARIES, 29 NOVEMBER 1787

with unreserved confidence, and feel himself secure; all the transactions
of the agent will meet with the most favorable construction, and the
measures he takes will give satisfaction. But, if the person employed be
a stranger, whom he has never seen, and whose character for ability or
fidelity he cannot fully learn-If he is constrained to choose him, be-
cause it was not in his power to procure one more agreeable to his
wishes, he will trust him with caution, and be suspicious of all his con-
duct.
If then this government should not derive support from the good
will of the people, it must be executed by force, or not executed at all;
either case would lead to the total destruction of liberty.-The conven-
tion seemed aware of this, and have therefore provided for calling out
the militia to execute the laws of the union. If this system was so framed
as to command that respect from the people, which every good free
government will obtain, this provision was unnecessary-the people
would support the civil magistrate. This power is a novel one, in free
governments-these have depended for the execution of the laws on
the Posse Comitatus, and never raised an idea, that the people would
refuse to aid the civil magistrate in executing those laws they themselves
had made. I shall now dismiss the subject of the incompetency of the
representation, and proceed, as I promised, to shew, that, impotent as
it is, the people have no security that they will enjoy the exercise of the
right of electing this assembly, which, at best, can be considered but as
the shadow of representation.
(By section 4, article 1, the Congress are authorized, at any time, by
law, to make, or alter, regulations respecting the time, place, and man-
ner of holding elections for senators and representatives, except as to
the places of choosing senators. By this clause the right of election
itself, is, in a great measure, transferred from the people to their rul-
ers.-One would think, that if any thing was necessary to be made a
fundamental article of the original compact, it would be, that of fixing
the branches of the legislature, so as to put it out of its power to alter
itself by modifying the election of its own members at will and pleasure.
When a people once resign the privilege of a fair election, they clearly
have none left worth contending for.)
It is clear that, under this article, the foederal legislature may institute
such rules respecting elections as to lead to the choice of one descrip-
tion of men. The weakness of the representation, tends but too cer-
tainly to confer on the rich and well-born, all honours; but the power
granted in this article, may be so exercised, as to secure it almost be-
yond a possibility of controul. The proposed Congress may make the
whole state one district, and direct, that the capital (the city of New-
York, for instance) shall be the place for holding the election; the con-

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