COMMENTARIES, 8 NOVEMBER 1787

bounds to those who make treaties, I am not able to say: If not, it proves
that this power ought to be more safely lodged.
The federal constitution, the laws of congress made in pursuance of
the constitution, and all treaties must have full force and effect in all
parts of the United States; and all other laws, rights and constitutions
which stand in their way must yield: It is proper the national laws
should be supreme, and superior to state or district laws; but then the
national laws ought to yield to alienable22 or fundamental rights-and
national laws, made by a few men, should extend only to a few national
objects. This will not be the case with the laws of congress: To have any
proper idea of their extent, we must carefully examine the legislative,
executive and judicial powers proposed to be lodged in the general
government, and consider them in connection with a general clause in
art. 1. sect. 8. in these words (after enumerating a number of powers)
"To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."-The powers of this government as
has been observed, extend to internal as well as external objects, and
to those objects to which all others are subordinate; it is almost impos-
sible to have a just conception of these powers, or of the extent and
number of the laws which may be deemed necessary and proper to
carry them into effect, till we shall come to exercise those powers and
make the laws. In making laws to carry those powers into effect, it will
be expected, that a wise and prudent congress will pay respect to the
opinions of a free people, and bottom their laws on those principles
which have been considered as essential and fundamental in the Brit-
ish, and in our government: But a congress of a different character will
not be bound by the constitution to pay respect to those principles.
It is said, that when the people make a constitution, and delegate
powers, that all powers not delegated by them to those who govern, is
reserved in the people; and that the people, in the present case, have
reserved in themselves, and in there state governments, every right and
power not expressly given by the federal constitution to those who shall
administer the national government. It is said, on the other hand, that
the people, when they make a constitution, yield all power not expressly
reserved to themselves. The truth is, in either case, it is mere matter
of opinion, and men usually take either side of the argument, as will
best answer their purposes: But the general presumption being, that
men who govern, will, in doubtful cases, construe laws and constitutions
most favourably for encreasing their own powers; all wise and prudent
people, in forming constitutions, have drawn the line, and carefully

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