1. DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTION

sequence would be, that none but men of the most elevated rank in
society would attend, and they would as certainly choose men of their
own class; as it is true what the Apostle Paul saith, that "no man ever
yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it."5-They may
declare that those members who have the greatest number of votes,
shall be considered as duly elected; the consequence would be that the
people, who are dispersed in the interior parts of the state, would give
their votes for a variety of candidates, while any order, or profession,
residing in populous places, by uniting their interests, might procure
whom they pleased to be chosen-and by this means the representa-
tives of the state may be elected by one tenth part of the people who
actually vote. This may be effected constitutionally, and by one of those
silent operations which frequently takes place without being noticed,
but which often produces such changes as entirely to alter a govern-
ment, subvert a free constitution, and rivet the chains on a free people
before they perceive they are forged. Had the power of regulating elec-
tions been left under the direction of the state legislatures, where the
people are not only nominally but substantially represented, it would
have been secure; but if it was taken out of their hands, it surely ought
to have been fixed on such a basis as to have put it out of the power
of the foederal legislature to deprive the people of it by law. Provision
should have been made for marking out the states into districts, and
for choosing, by a majority of votes, a person out of each of them of
permanent property and residence in the district which he was to rep-
resent.
(If the people of America will submit to a constitution that will vest
in the hands of any body of men a right to deprive them by law of the
privilege of a fair election, they will submit to almost any thing. Rea-
soning with them will be in vain, they must be left until they are
brought to reflection by feeling oppression-they will then have to
wrest from their oppressors, by a strong hand; that which they now
possess, and which they may retain if they will exercise but a moderate
share of prudence and firmness.
I know it is said that the dangers apprehended from this clause are
merely imaginary, that the proposed general legislature will be disposed
to regulate elections upon proper principles, and to use their power
with discretion, and to promote the public good. On this, I would ob-
serve, that constitutions are not so necessary to regulate the conduct
of good rulers as to restrain that of bad ones.-Wise and good men
will exercise power so as to promote the public happiness under any
form of government. If we are to take it for granted, that those who
administer the government under this system, will always pay proper
attention to the rights and interests of the people, nothing more was