WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 1985-1986


    First, there was no constitutional, statutory or common law privilege
which the child could use
  to claim exemption from the requirement to testify. The Court could find
no precedent for
  completely excusing a witness from his or her duty to testify because of
emotional harm. Justice
  Abrahamson noted that although there was an increase in governmental assistance
to victims
  and witnesses in the criminal justice system, there was no proposal that
children be excused
  altogether in criminal proceedings. Excusing the child from testifying
might be advantageous at
  present, but in the long run it might block the conviction of her alleged
abuser.
    The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court erred in quashing the subpoena.
Rather, the
  Supreme Court suggested a number of possible steps to reduce the emotional
strain of testifying.
  The Supreme Court did not prescribe guidelines or a set procedure, stating
that:
        "We believe that the attorneys and circuit judge closest to
this proceeding are in the
      best position to attempt to devise a solution, keeping in mind BP's
particular fear of
      facing her mother, to eliminate or minimize the burden on BP, to protect
the constitu-
      tional rights of the accused, and to protect the public interest in
the fair administration
      of justice and in bringing the accused to trial." (page 518)

 Juries - Jury Deliberation
    What materials may a juror bring with him or her into the jury room during
deliberations?
 Also, given the need for secrecy during the jury deliberation process, what
is the procedure to
 determine if one or more jurors have acted improperly?
   The defendant in State v. Ott, 111 Wis. 2d 691 (1983), was convicted for
causing injury by
 conduct regardless of life. The defendant sought postconviction relief because
a juror had
 brought in a dictionary definition of the word "depraved." The
trial court determined that the
 act did not show sufficient probable prejudice to require a new trial and
denied the motion.
   The defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and
order and ordered
 a new trial. Chief Judge Decker first noted that the question of what constituted
a "depraved
 mind" was of central importance in the case. The trial court gave the
jurors a definition of
 "depraved mind." When the jury began deliberations, they were
given a written copy of the jury
 instructions, including the "depraved mind" instruction. After
deliberating for over 5 hours, the
 jury went home for the night and reassembled the following morning. On that
following morn-
 ing they reached a guilty verdict.
   The defendant's appellate counsel learned that a juror may have brought
in, on the following
 morning, a dictionary definition written on a card. The trial court allowed
counsel to investigate
 the matter, subject to restrictions to not intrude on the "mental processes
of the jurors."
   On review, the Court of Appeals noted that Section 906.06 (2) of the statutes
controls on
 questions ofjury verdicts. The statute provides that generally the juror
may not testify regarding
 matters occurring in the course of deliberations, except if there is extraneous
prejudicial informa-
 tion given to the jury or if there is any improper outside influence.
   The investigation indicated that 9 of the jurors remembered that a juror
brought in a diction-
 ary definition, 2 could not remember and one refused to talk about it. The
exact definition which
 was brought in was not part of the record. The appellate attorneys noted
a number of dictionary
 definitions concerning "depravity," and the Court of Appeals looked
at others as well. The state
 argued that any error would not be prejudicial as the dictionary and jury
instruction were actu-
 ally equivalent. The court disagreed, concluding that the dictionary definition,
which used terms
 like "perverted" or "corrupt," was broader than the
written jury instruction. The court felt that
 the extraneous material was on a central issue of the case and that "the
probable effect upon a
 hypothetical average jury would be prejudicial."

                             STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Worker's Compensation - Horseplay
   Should an employe be eligible for worker's compensation benefits if he
or she is injured while
engaged in horseplay? Although a common reaction might be that horseplay
is clearly not part
of the job, the determination of eligibility for benefits is not that simple.
  The case of Bruns Volkswagen, Inc., v. DILHR, 110 Wis. 2d 319 (1982), illustrates
the criteria a
court uses to determine eligibility. In Bruns, the foreman and a mechanic
started wrestling at the


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