Govt made strenuous efforts, through its Ambassador here and through
Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, to prevent Iranian Govt from send-
ing its troops to Azerbaij an. Both Shah and Qavam considered
these efforts genuine and expected that USSR would assist Azer-
baijanis much more effectively than they did. For this reason origi-
nal military plan of Iranian Govt extended only to occupation of
Mianeh. If this could be achieved Iranians planned to wait and see
what happened. Sudden collapse of Tabriz movement was obviously
as great surprise to Qavam as it was to Shah and everyone else.
  Why Soviets failed to give more assistance to their puppets in
Tabriz is difficult to judge here. From evidence we can see whole
question was badly handled by Soviet officials from beginning. Such
help as Soviets gave Azerbaijan regime during past year was rather
niggard and accompanied by close bargaining. Soviets made Azer-
baijanis pay high prices in wheat and other commodities for such
supplies as were accorded. While considerable amounts of automatic
rifles, ammunition, and light equipment were furnished, no heavy
armament was included. Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, instead
of guiding regime unobtrusively, demonstrated his control in brazen
and swaggering manner, thus depriving Pishavari of the considerable
local support he gained among Azerbaijanis during early days of
regime. As result, when Iranian forces entered province local people
themselves overthrew regime. Of the large number of persons sent
into Azerbaijan from Caucasus, only two, Pishavari and Daneshyan,
appear to have had much ability.
  Soviet Ambassador here or his principals in Moscow misjudged
Qavam's psychology and overplayed their hand by threatening himr
personally. Qavam had been wavering on question of notification to
SC but Soviet threat angered him. When he received word that US
concurred in his right to notify Council he decided to do so on the
spot, without even consulting his Cabinet.
  It is suggested that Soviet failure to send combat units to support
Azerbaijan may have resulted from fact that Azerbaijan regime col-
lapsed too fast, from internal considerations in USSR, from broader
questions of foreign policy connected with Europe, from fear of SC.
and world opinion censure, or combination of all of them. General
impression here is that SC saved Iran from invasion.
  Department requested repeat to Moscow if appropriate. Moscow's
views regarding foregoing would be useful to us.
  Sent Paris repeated Dept as 1619.
                                                           ALE



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