THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS



The resignation of General Araki from the post of Minister of War
and the appointment of Mr. Hirota as Minister for Foreign Affairs
were two of the developments which were regarded as earnests of
change in the direction of an enlightened policy, although it seemed
inevitable that the new policy must fall far short of that policy which
was followed by Shidehara. The successful establishment of such a
policy depended (1) on Chinese acquiescence and (2) on the conviction
of the reactionary Japanese elements that such a policy would succeed
and would be best for Japan's interests. The institution on July 1,
1934, of through traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway without em-
barrassment to the National Government from any part of China
indicated that the first point had, for the time being at least, been
attained. That the second point may not have been attained is indi-
cated by the recent report (my despatch No. 2972 of September 13,
1934) that the military have succeeded in obtaining the acceptance of
the Japanese authorities of a policy of dealing regionally with China
and of non-support of General Chiang Kai-shek outside of the
Yangtze Valley.
  Whether or not this report of a policy of conciliation again being
quashed is true, I doubt whether it is a fundamentally vital factor in
the situation. I cannot but feel that the Japanese have committed
during the past three years so many wrongs against China that these,
when added to the wrongs committed prior to the Manchurian incident,
have created a situation which makes it impossible for Japan to gain
the friendship of China through any policy, regardless of its degree
of liberality. It is perhaps possible that a complete reversal of Japa-
nese policy, including a return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty,
might have its effect, but it is doubtful if a situation will develop
within Japan whereby a Japanese government could do this and
survive.
  In other words, Japan seems now to have reached a point in its
relations with China where there is no policy which Japan can adopt
which holds out promise of bringing to Japan what is requisite if she
is to continue as a first class power. So it scarcely matters whether
the reactionary military forms Japan's policy toward China or
whether the so-called liberals do.
  It is easy to understand the opposition of the Japanese military to a
policy of conciliation of China. During recent months the Japanese
have seen indications of an extension of the power of General Chiang
Kai-shek, of efforts toward economic rehabilitation, of effective
increases in military strength. The Japanese have reason to believe
that if these developments are allowed to continue, China will eventu-
ally attempt to liquidate her problems in foreign relations, primarily
the problem of Japanese aggression. It is not surprising, therefore,



277