FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1934, VOLUME III



can Government at Geneva, encourages us to believe that America
would take full part in economic sanctions. If I call attention to two
passages in that declaration, I do hope that the House will believe that
I do not do it with any desire to minimize the value of the declaration,
but I do it for the purpose of clearness. In the first place, if all the
conditions here are satisfied, what is it that the United States are good
enough to say their Government would do? It is this, 'we will refrain
from any action'-not 'we will take any action'-'tending to defeat
such collective effort'. Whose collective effort? Not a collective effort
in which the United States take part, but a collective effort of other
people, 'which the states'-not the United States-'may thus make to
restore peace'.
  My honorable and learned friend the member for South Nottingham
(Mr. Knight) has lately [just] said that it is a [valuable] declaration,
and I would be the very last to say it is not because it means this:
suppose there arose what I may perhaps call a flagrant case in which
the American nation was deeply stirred and suppose that the states
of Europe or the other states of the world had the means by which
they could put some pressure upon what is here called 'the violator'
and suppose we will insofar [went so far] as to do it, it is a very
material thing to know that if such action commended itself to the
United States we might be sure that the United States Government
would do nothing whatever to encourage its own citizens or to defend
them if they tried to break the ring. It is a very material thing, and
corresponds in some degree with the situation which developed at one
stage of the war. But it is a very different thing the [from] saying,
'here are economic sanctions waiting to be adopted if it were not
for the pusillanimity of the British Government, and if only the
critics in the House formed a government we would have economic
sanctions before you could say "Jack Robinson."' "
  Following Simon, Baldwin 23 pointed out that in his opinion limi-
tation was probably the only practical form of disarmament in air,
that it was difficult to see how sanctions could be avoided against a
transgressor and "if we go in for the collective maintenance of
peace, it is no good going in for it [first] unless we are prepared
to fight in will and also in material. Nothing could be a worse guar-
antee to the world or a more cruel deception of our own people
than to say, we will guarantee peace by arms, but not be ready for
information [it]. There is no doubt that if we are going to en-
force a collective guarantee or collective sanction, it means we have
to make this country a great deal stronger than she is today."
  Baldwin then referred to his recent pronouncement on air policy
(despatch No. 566, March 16 24) and stated that the required prelimi-
nary work to strengthen the air force was being done so that no time
should be lost if his pledge had to be implemented.
                                                        BINGHAM



3 Stanley A. Baldwin, British Lord President of the Council.
24 Not printed.



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