THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS



British note to Tokyo believed chiefly to reaffirm British position
under the Nine-Power Treaty.
  Press reports from the United States quote Ambassador Saito as
saying in press interview that Japan's restatement of policy-with re-
gard to China resulted from the American wheat and cotton credit
and from sale of American airplanes to China.
  Repeated to Peck at Nanking for information and communication
by air mail to the Minister.
                                                         JOHNSON

793.94/6602 Telegram
  The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary
                             of State

                                  LONDON, April 24, 1934-8 p. m.
                                  [Received April 24-4: 55 p. m.]
  196. I was unable to obtain an appointment with Simon today due
to Suvich's 45 visit and accordingly instructed Atherton46 to discuss
Department's 156, April 23, 6 p. m., with Sir Victor Wellesley. Wel-
lesley stated that he would convey to the Foreign Secretary the De-
partment's statement and gave Atherton his personal viewpoint on
the situation, which I repeat merely for background, and request
that no reference be made to these personal remarks of a Foreign
Office official.
  Wellesley stated that the British note to Japan, reported in my
192, April 23, 10 p. M.47 also referred to the position of both England
and Japan under their treaty obligations, and more especially the
Nine-Power Treaty. He felt that the recent Japanese statement was
made by Japan through fear of the development of a united China and
an effective military spirit which had been strengthening since the
Manchurian campaign. While America and England had a common
interest in a strong and united China, this was the opposite from what
Japan wanted. It was all very well, according to Wellesley, for nine
powers to sign a paper pact but if no teeth were written into it to
make it effective, how many nations were prepared to back up today
any unsuccessful representations made to Japan in connection with
her China policy. Wellesley was obviously very skeptical that Great
Britain would consider any use of threats towards Japan except under
provocation of some grave incident and equally doubtful as to how
far the United States would go, and under these circumstances was
apparently of the opinion that individual action was preferable in the

45 ilyvio Suvich, Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
46 Ray Atherton, Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain.
47 See footnote 40, p. 125.



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