THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS



spite of this statement he gave me the distinct impression that he was
far from optimistic with regard to the future. lie said that a meeting
of the principal generals of division will take place in Tokyo some time
this month* and that the pros and cons of an attack on Soviet Russia
will be thoroughly discussed at that time. He alluded to the signifi-
cant fact that a similar meeting of generals had taken place shortly
before the outbreak of the Manchurian adventure in September 1931.
He said that Hayashi has constantly worked against Soviet Russia,
particularly in Sinkiang, and that while it is very difficult to get a
precise line on his present attitude, there seems to be no good reason
to credit him with peaceful intentions.
  Mr. Youreneff repeated what he has frequently said to me before
that the Soviet Union is fully prepared for all eventualities, and is
strongly fortified both in Vladivostok and along the Siberian border.
The double tracking of the trans-Siberian railway has been carried on
steadily throughout the winter in spite of the intense cold. If the
Japanese should attack, they could of course pour immense forces
into Manchuria and might be able to take Vladivostok and the adjacent
portion of Eastern Siberia, but further operations would entail ex-
tending and weakening their lines of communication, and little by
little the Soviets could pour more and more troops into that region.
If war should commence, it would not stop until one side or the other
was completely exhausted, and it would take a long time to exhaust
the almost unlimited power of the Soviets. Japan's navy, he said, is
of course, incomparably stronger than the Russian navy but the Rus-
sian fleet of submarines at Vladivostok is very strong and the sinking
of a Japanese battleship or two would have immense significance and
would alter the whole situation in the Far East. He said furthermore
that while the Soviet measures were now purely defensive in character,
if war should break out these measures would immediately become
offensive, and unless Japan should quickly win an outstanding victory
the Soviets would be able to occupy part or all of Manchuria, espe-
cially, he said as at least 100,000 of the present troops of "Manchukuo"
would support the Soviet arms and might turn the whole tide of the
operations.
  I said to the Ambassador that most of the foreign military experts
in Tokyo believe that the Japanese army will reach the zenith of its
combat efficiency in 1935 and that, if war is intended, the spring of
1935 will be the most likely moment for attack. The Ambassador
replied that while nobody could foresee a precise date, he thought it

* This meeting of division commanders is scheduled to meet in Tokyo on March
26 and to last for five days. It is not an annual meeting but is said to
be cus-
tomarily held after the appointment of a new Minister of War. [Footnote in
the
original.]



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