86 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1934, VOLUME III

dence now available in Japan indicates that an early attack upon
Soviet Russia is being considered. There are listed below a number
of observations which suggest that Japan has no intention of delib-
erately provoking a conflict this coming spring or summer.

(1). The Military Attaché of the Embassy has just returned from
a twelve day inspection trip of various military establishments and
writes concerning the regiments he visited, “No evidence of tenseness
or any apprehension of war was noticed, nor was the training being
hurried in any way” and further, reviewing his whole trip, “In
general, nothing was seen or sensed that would indicate that the
Japanese army is engaged in unusual preparations for war or that
war during 1984 is anticipated.”

(2). The Assistant Naval Attaché of the Embassy reports that the
Nakajima Aircraft Factories which manufacture the majority of the
most modern Japanese pursuit planes is working upon an eight hour
a day schedule, not upon a war-time 24 hour a day schedule although
it is in aviation perhaps that Japan has the most to fear from
Soviet Russia.

(3). The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Koiso, has been transferred to the command of the Fifth Division
stationed at Hiroshima in Southern Japan. Since General Koiso is
not only one of the most able men in the Japanese army but has an
unrivalled knowledge of the situation in Manchuria it is questioned -
whether this normal step in his career would not be postponed were
an early conflict in prospect.

(4). The correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, Mr. Reginald
Sweetland, has just returned to Toyko from Manchuria and reports
that he had a conversation with Major General Doihara, the “Law-
rence of Manchuria” and leading Intelligence Officer in the Japanese
army. General Doihara stated that it was impossible for Japan to
fight Soviet Russia at the present time for three reasons: first, that
world opinion was not behind Japan and that she could not afford
to further isolate herself internationally; second, that a war would
last three years and be too great a strain on the nation’s strength; and
third, that it would take ten years to consolidate “Manchukuo” and
to attempt a war in the face of a potentially unstable condition behind
the lines would not be possible.

(5). Ambassador Youreneff is of the opinion that a meeting of
the principal Japanese generals of division, which is scheduled for
March 26,* will discuss the pros and cons of an attack upon Soviet
Russia and implied that this was an extraordinary meeting, similar
to one held shortly before the outbreak of the Manchurian adventure

* It is reported that there is to be a routine meeting of division chiefs of staff
in April. [Footnote in the original.] .