THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS



bandits, of sabotage, robberies and murders; and that these allegations
were officially supported by the Japanese War Minister and officials
of Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Japanese Manchurian
authorities had leveled similar accusations against official institutions
and representatives of the Soviet Union in Manchuria, namely, Soviet
Consul and Consulate at Pogranichnaya as well as commanding staff
of Red Army in Far East.
  Note states that Soviet Government regards these actions which
coincide with virtual breaking off of negotiations for sale of railway
as disorganizing the work of the railway and flagrant violation of
treaty rights.
  The note drew particular attention to official communique of
August 17 in which Japanese War Office alleged "orders for the carry-
ing out of train wrecks and attacks are issued by the Far Eastern Red
Army" which was accused of supervising bandit detachments along
the Chinese Eastern Railway through the medium of an actually
nonexistent organ of Soviet employees on Chinese Eastern Railway.
These statements of the Japanese War Office accompanied utterances
of an aggressive nature in respect of the U.S.S.R. Soviet note de-
scribes foregoing as intensification of aggressive intention of "certain
official Japanese circles". The note ends as follows:
  "The Soviet Government holding the Manchurian authorities and
the Japanese Government responsible for above actions has instructed
me, Mr. Minister, to submit its protest to you. The Government of
the U.S.S.R. trusts that the Japanese Government will draw the
necessary deductions."
                                                          BULLITT
761.94/781
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary
                             of State
                             [Extract]
No. 149                                 Moscow, August 24, 1934.
                                          [Received September 8.]
  SIR:

  The consensus among foreign observers in Moscow is that the nego-
tiations have not been inspired by transparent sincerity on either side;
have, indeed, been "Asiatic". The Soviet expression of willingness
in May 1933 to dispose of its share of the Chinese Eastern Railway
was presumably dictated by tactical considerations; by the desire
to appease a menacing situation and to establish moral superiority
vis-a-vis Japan.



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