THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS



in September 1931. I am now informed by the Military Attache that
this is a purely routine conference which is held periodically.
  (6). There are no reports from Manchuria indicating an unusual
concentration of Japanese troops nor any unusual preparations which
would substantiate the Soviet fears of an early attack.
  (7). It has puzzled foreign observers to note that the Foreign
Office continues to oppose the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with
Soviet Russia prior to the settlement of specific problems between
the two countries. To Occidental observers this has seemed like put-
ting the cart before the horse and has, in certain quarters, cast doubt
upon the genuineness of Japan's desire to settle the Russian situation
amicably. The matter was explained by a member of the Foreign
Office staff to a member of my staff as follows: "There is a strong
minority in Japan which believes that war between this country and
Russia is inevitable and that the sooner it comes the better. If a
non-aggression pact should be negotiated while there were still serious
problems pending between the two nations, this minority would prob-
ably become very vociferous and might even force a crisis. In Japan
minorities are not ignored, they are compromised with. The plan
of the Foreign Office is to reach a settlement of the Chinese Eastern
Railway and fisheries questions and thus to remove all grounds which
the militant minority have for opposing a non-aggression pact". In
the light of the above explanation, settlement of the two problems
mentioned would seem significant steps towards a restoration of
normal relations between the two countries.
  (8). Certain conditions for war which were present in 1904 are
lacking in 1934. Two major factors in the Japanese decision to attack
Russia thirty years ago were the Anglo-Japanese alliance2 and a
friendly attitude on the part of America which enabled the Japanese
leaders to believe that it would be possible to finance the struggle. At
the present time Japan is apparently isolated internationally and, in
view of the Soviet-American rapprochement, there is general uncer-
tainty as to what America's attitude would be in case of war.
  In concluding this despatch I refer to a conversation which took
place recently between a member of my staff and an official of the
Soviet Embassy in Nanking who has just come from Moscow. This
official states that in Moscow government leaders do not believe that
war with Japan is inevitable but that there is a 50-50 chance of one,
that they feel that Japan has learnt a great deal about Russia's power
in the last six months, and that she is therefore not so sure of herself.
He further remarked that the Soviet preparations for war involve no
assumption that they would receive any aid from China in case hos-
tilities with Japan break out. Viewing the situation from Tokyo I

2 Signed at London, January 30,1902, Foreign Relations, 1902, p. 514.



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