68



FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1934, VOLUME III



26 during the course of a conversation on the general situation. Nebil
Bey asserted that he knows the Minister of War, General Hayashi,
well, that the latter told him that Japan could never feel at ease so
long as there were Russian troops and aeroplanes in Eastern Siberia
and that this threat would have to be definitely eliminated. Nebil
Bey thinks that the danger of a war with Soviet Russia was much
less under Araki who is more a theorist and a dreamer than a man of
action, but that Hayashi is distinctly a man of action and that only
the restraining influence of Hirota and other pacifist influences pre-
vent an early attack. The American recognition of Soviet Russia he
considers a restraining factor because the Japanese do not know what
America would'do in case of war and a neutrality benevolent to the
Soviets might be serious to Japan.
  It is apparent that only close personal association could substantiate
or invalidate the above estimate of General Hayashi together with
its implications, and the Embassy is thus far unable to evaluate
authoritatively Nebil Bey's opinion although the Military Attache
is making every effort to obtain information on this precise matter.
It will be remembered, however, that at the time of the Mukden
Incident of September 18, 1931, General Hayashi, then commander of
the Korean Garrison, did not await orders from headquarters but
immediately and on his own initiative despatched troops across the
border. To comment further on the hypothesis that an attack on
Soviet Russia might be possible during General Hayashi's tenure of
office, I have reported several times that the Japanese are genuinely
alarmed at the strength of the Soviet air base at Vladivostok and I
have also noted on several occasions the Japanese tendency to adopt
the method of attack as the best defence. It would not be at variance
with the present day Japanese concept of "self-defence" for a
Japanese force to attempt the removal of this menace.
  In comment on the above statements I feel obliged to point out that
the hypothesis advanced by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires stands or
falls on his understanding of General Hayashi and that the ordinary
fallibility of personal judgments is in this case heightened by differ-
ences of race and psychology. I am more inclined, in fact, to con-
cur with the view recently expressed by the Counselor of the German
Embassy to a member of my staff to the effect that there would be no
clash this spring, although the Japanese and the Soviets would ulti-
mately, of course, have to come to terms and agree definitely on the
basis on which they would live as neighbors. It is, moreover, inter-
esting to note that this official, who has a background of many years
experience in Japan, views the future of "Manchukuo" largely as
a
function of Soviet-Japanese relations. In other words, while he
recognizes that China has been eliminated from the Manchurian