Preparations for the Summit Conference 181



would be likely to induce the Soviets to hold back on an East German
peace treaty.
    6. New Berlin Status. In the long run, the alternative to Soviet uni-
lateral action would seem to be an agreement which met both the West-
ern requirement for continuing Three Power military presence in and
access to Berlin and the Soviet requirement for legal change in Berlin's
"occupation status." The President seemed interested before the
Paris
meeting7 in the possibility of a new status for Berlin. In his discussion
with the other Heads of Government he seemed to be paving the way
for such a proposal by stressing the vulnerability of our present position
in Berlin to creeping pressure. Adenauer's and de Gaulle's reaction
made clear how vigorously they would object to any such proposal
now. The Chancellor showed particular sensitivity to its possible effect
on his position in the forthcoming German elections.
    7. Holding Action. Neither standing on our Geneva position, nor
discussing German unity and disarmament, nor proposing an immedi-
ate change of status thus seem very promising means of forestalling So-
viet unilateral action. This suggests the possible desirability of a 1960
"holding" action, which would (i) "freeze" the situation
in Berlin until
after the US and German elections, (ii) begin somewhat to accustom our
allies to the long-term possibility of a new status.
    This holding action might consist of a tacit agreement to put Berlin
on ice for eighteen months or so, by setting up a Four Power working
group to consider means of reducing frictions in Berlin and report back
in late 1961. If the Soviets wished some temporary explicit agreement,
we could also propose concomitant unilateral declarations by both sides
on the order of solution "C" in the London Working Group report,8
i.e.,
declarations to avoid disturbing activities and maintain freedom of ac-
cess, but without any mention of troop reductions or attempt to con-
clude the kind of formal and comprehensive agreement that would
have to deal with the "rights" issue.
    8. Procedure. If our allies agreed, Ambassador Thompson could be
instructed to convey a Presidential proposal to Khrushchev for a tacit
temporary "freeze" before the May Summit. Such a personal approach
might appeal to Khrushchev's desire for direct high-level dealings.
    In suggesting this unarticulated "freeze" to Khrushchev the
Presi-
dential message could indicate the difficulties of substantive negotia-
tions until after the US and German elections. The President could also


    7For documentation on President Eisenhower's meetings with de Gaulle,
Macmil-
lan, and Adenauer in Paris December 19-21, 1959, see Documents 54-60.
    8See vol. VIII, Document 270. Solution C of the section on Berlin suggested
various
declarations that might be made during an interim cooling off period by any
or several of
the powers involved in the Berlin crisis.