14 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



6.   Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the
     Department of State

                                   London, August 29, 1959, noon.

    Secto 21. Pass Defense-OSD for Secretary McElroy, OSD/ISA for
Knight and Barringer, JCS for Generals Twining and Picher from Secre-
tary Gates.
    Memorandum of conversation Secretaries Gates and Irwin with
Defense Minister Strauss, 1100-1300 hours, August 27. Mr. Strauss car-
ried the conversation for the first hour or more outlining his views on
Berlin, disengagement, disarmament and general German problems.
He opened the discussion with Berlin. He felt the Soviets would claim
they had guaranteed status quo for Berlin and would then seek a price
from the Western allies. He feels Mr. Khrushchev understands he can-
not adhere to his original demand. Believes British will seek a new ap-
proach. Mr. Strauss firmly opposed to a Soviet free city plan or to
establishing a joint committee with equal vote. He felt the equal vote
procedure meant eventual defeat for the West since democratic repre-
sentatives would not present a uniform position as compared to the dis-
ciplined Communist representatives. He was apprehensive that either
the free city or joint committee approach would create uncertainty in
Germany leading to a soft German line, neutrality, anti-NATO propa-
ganda, et cetera.
    He thought the United Kingdom would propose some form of dis-
engagement. Disengagement appears senseless to him, regardless of
what form it takes. He believes any effort toward disengagement would
lead to German neutrality and the neutrality of Europe and Berlin
would be forfeited as a by-product.
    Mr. Irwin outlined our firm Geneva position that there could be no
treaty with a divided Germany. He questioned Strauss regarding his
view on disengagement and its relation to the question of inspection.
    Mr. Strauss responded that inspection is not the same as disengage-
ment. He volunteered that Germany would never be an obstacle to a re-
alistic general disarmament proposal. Disarmament must be on the
basis of forfeiting "Military Equivalence" on both sides. This
does not
mean necessarily equal areas but military capability. Regarding inspec-
tion he could not accept a Western area of inspection whose boundaries
coincided with the frontiers of West Germany. In addition, the Eastern
inspection area must include some part of the USSR. Inspection of a sat-



    Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2959. Secret; Priority.
Transmit-
ted in two sections.