Preparations for the Summit Conference 211



Powers will have little to gain from pressing for a complete resolution of
the Berlin question at the May meeting. Given the pressures and rigidi-
ties of the moment, the Western Powers would probably stand to benefit
more from postponing a final settlement until these rigidities and pres-
sures can be mitigated by the passage of time.
    8. This temporizing approach might perhaps be more acceptable
to the Soviets if some gesture could be made in the all-German field.
However, German and French resistance to such a gesture may prove
adamant. The forthcoming visit of Chancellor Adenauer10 could pro-
vide an occasion for raising the possibility, in the hope that by placing
it
within the context of the Berlin problem in all of its developing as-
pects-including Berlin contingency planning-he may show some re-
siliency.
Recommendations
    9. That the Department further study the development of a West-
ern position aimed essentially at postponing a showdown on Berlin at
the May Summit by offering the Soviets sufficient inducement, as well
as deterrent, so that they will not feel impelled immediately to take ac-
tion which fundamentally affects the Western position in Berlin. This
will involve a flexible approach intended to take advantage of tactical
possibilities which might develop.
    10. That this position include a willingness to consider an interim
arrangement and/or set of unilateral declarations along the lines of So-
lution C of the London Working Group Report, plus continuing negotia-
tion or discussion of the Berlin question at a different level, if such an
arrangement seems more likely to provide a basis for freezing the essen-
tial status quo in Berlin than one patterned after the Geneva proposals of
July 28.
    11. That we consider using the visit of Chancellor Adenauer in an
effort to obtain his agreement to (or at least to start him thinking about)
somewhat more flexible Western tactics in dealing with the Berlin situ-
ation so as to make more likely a development of the Berlin problem
along the lines described above.
    12. That in the Four-Power Working Group, we take no final posi-
tions but continue, until a more intensive period of preparations be-
tween the Adenauer visit and the mid-April meetings of Foreign
Ministers, to develop useful background materials, to attempt to bring
to the Germans information concerning Western contingency plans, and
to study all relevant aspects of the basic requirements which must be
met to maintain our essential position in Berlin.



10 See Documents 86-94.