600 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



    One of best by-products of pushing consideration and selective ap-
plication of countermeasures is that they counter tendency towards
softness and skepticism re this area of which Sept 30 NAC meeting gave
evidence. Concrete FedRep actions to date in abrogating trade agree-
ment, discouraging participation Leipzig Fair, and supporting Allied
travel restrictions on GDR, undercut much of negative argumentation.
From this viewpoint we think present course necessary if we are to hope
for later essential NATO-wide acceptance of joint action.
    Although perhaps inadequate to stop total Soviet maneuver, these
measures add indications of willingness to proceed further, may have
real utility in discouraging both Moscow and also GDR capriciousness
in excess of presumed Soviet instructions. Intelligence reports already
suggest GDR dismay at anticipated damage to economic plan. Believe
should rest content with present psychological impact achieved, rather
than risk threats to urge slowdown of GDR workers, which would be
risky and also fortify charges that we, not they, are provoking crisis.
    We do not believe that FedRep election considerations primary in
determining present German reactions to Berlin pressures. Basic rea-
sons for German firmness appear be, on one plane, consciousness that
public mood requires it, and on other plane growing conviction that cri-
sis shaping up, for which it high time to make preparations. Latter sense
of urgency, which long present in FonOff, now spreading through up-
per FedGovt and Berlin administrations. In our view this is salutary de-
velopment, and absolutely requisite preliminary if public opinion to be
prepared for possible showdown.
    Finally, following questions appear pertinent: (1) If in fact Khru-
shchev plans to provoke crisis, should we permit him to choose his own
time for so doing, and in particular delay such crisis until early next
year, when General Assembly no longer in session and free world and
neutral concern provoked by other Soviet pressures, including Congo
and drive against UN, may have subsided? (2) Similarly, morale and
economy of West Berliners presumably in as good shape at present to
stand crises as later. And while we agree completely as to desirability of
British and other Allies making clear to Kremlin their determination to
hold Berlin, can we be sure that Khrushchev entertains no doubts re-
garding US determination as well?
                                                             Morris


    2At the North Atlantic Council meeting on September 30, the Federal Republic
of
Germany announced its decision to denounce the interzonal trade agreement,
but the
United States was the only NATO member to directly support this action. Several
repre-
sentatives, including the British and French, expressed strong doubt about
the appropri-
ateness and timing of economic countermeasures. (Department of State, Secretary's
Daily
Summaries: Lot 61 D 258, October 3, 1960)