58 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



Soviets with the last Western proposals made at Geneva, the Secretary
said that he found it hard to work out in his mind how a summit meeting
would go. Who, for example, would be the personalities involved? Per-
haps there would be a new Government in the United Kingdom. Per-
haps Lloyd would be replaced. (The Secretary noted that Lloyd had told
him at Geneva that he had been much happier as Defense Minister than
as Foreign Minister.) Butler appeared to want the job; Ormsby-Gore was
also a possibility. No one wants to get out on a limb until we know who
we will be talking with. There were accordingly no new proposals yet,
and certainly none would be put up to the Soviets without the consent of
the Allies.
    Ambassador Grewe asked whether the American Government felt
itself to be under any real pressure to put up new proposals. The Secre-
tary replied that, as of now, it did not. He had talked to the French For-
eign Minister earlier today6 and the French had no new proposals. It
was hard, in fact, to see from where new proposals could come. When
he was last in Bonn,7 the Secretary continued, he had asked whether von
Brentano had any ideas as to how the West could seize the initiative. The
German Foreign Minister had promised to write him a personal letter
after consulting with Chancellor Adenauer, but so far nothing had been
received. Ambassador Grewe commented that it was hard to conceive
of any new ideas emerging in the next few months; the field had been
pretty well exhausted during the intensive work prior to and at Geneva.
    The Secretary said that Gromyko had raised with him the question
of whether we were going to talk about a security zone in Central
Europe or disarmament in a limited area. The Secretary added that he
had indicated that we did not want this brought up at Camp David, and
that we would only discuss such security arrangements in the context of
an over-all plan for German reunification. In the view of the Soviets, dis-
armament and the German problem are apparently closely linked to-
gether. They show fear that someone may appear in Germany with a
more martial bent than the present leadership. One cannot be certain, of
course, whether this stems from real conviction or is merely an act.
When Mikoyan saw Secretary Dulles last January the letter had said
that, if Germany were to be reunified, the Soviets would obviously have
a right to certain assurances relative to the united Germany. Perhaps the
Soviets had built too much hope on this with respect to restricting Ger-
man military activities, the Secretary added.
    Ambassador Grewe said he was in a position to state that the von
Eckardt remarks in a recent press conference,8 which had widely been


    6A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 396.1/10-159.
    7See Document 7.
    8Not further identified.