Status of Berlin, August-December 1959 37



war. The question of the recognition of the German Democratic Repub-
lic could be avoided. The United States could sign a peace treaty with
West Germany and the Soviets could sign a treaty with both Germanies
and this problem of recognition could be avoided. He understood that
Berlin and the German problem had become a symbol involving pres-
tige. Therefore we should try to come to terms about the period of time
during which the Germans would be encouraged to reach agreement.
He did not think they could do so but we would be released of certain
responsibilities. After this period we could proceed with the peace
treaty. He did not believe that any of the Allies wanted German unity,
including de Gaulle and Macmillan. Although de Gaulle himself would
not say it straight out, those around him said it would be even better if
there were three or four Germanies. The British said that if there were
one German State the balance in Europe would be upset. This was true
because no other country in Europe could stand up to a united Ger-
many.
    The President interjected that the United States and the Soviets
could.
    Khrushchev said he meant in Europe. He said, of course, that even
if Germany were unified it would be no menace to the Soviet Union or
the United States but it might involve our two countries in a war. He
suspected that Adenauer did not want Germany united. His support
was mainly Catholic while East Germany was mostly Protestant. If Ger-
many were united probably the Socialists would come to power. Why
should we quarrel about reunification when the Germans themselves
did not want it? He even suspected that there was no great enthusiasm
for German unification in the United States.
    The President said he did not know what these European leaders
thought about reunification on the short term but on the long term he
thought that they were agreed; that the East and West Germans were
brothers and that to keep them apart was not in the best interest of a
peaceful world. To review the situation, war had brought about an un-
natural situation among us all. It had brought up quarrels. From what
Khrushchev had told him at the breakfast table3 a more liberal attitude
has developed in the Soviet Union than existed in the time of the
Generalissimo. He pointed out that this heavy burden of armaments
was very dangerous. If they were to be statesmen, they had to resolve
these problems. Berlin was a residue of the war, so was the division of
Germany. The question was how could we resolve all these problems,
such as lasting disarmament, et cetera. His own concern was that the


    3A memorandum of the President's conversation with Khrushchev at breakfast
on
September 26 is in volume X, Document 129.