Preparations for the Summit Conference 411



that the duration could be related to the length of the research program.
The Secretary said that this would be dangerous since there had been a
great deal of talk about the research program going on for five years. We
felt that two years would suffice for preliminary results from the re-
search program. The moratorium should start with the date of signa-
ture, as was contemplated in the March 29 communique.1
    Mr. Lloyd agreed and asked for the U.S. position on dealing with
the quota. Did we want one quota or two? The Secretary said that he saw
no sense in insisting on a quota to be applied below the threshold. Per-
haps we could seek agreement that there would be a few inspections for
experimental purposes. These would not be provided for within the
treaty. Mr. Lloyd agreed, saying that these inspections could be repre-
sented as part of the research program. He asked for the U.S. position on
the number of inspections above the threshold. The Secretary referred to
the RAND report2 as relevant in this connection stating that it was the
first hopeful scientific breakthrough we had had in these negotiations.
This was something which would be helpful to us in achieving Senate
consent to ratification.
    Mr. Lloyd asked how we would propose to handle the negotiations
and whether we wished to suggest re-spacing of the control stations to
the Soviets. The Secretary reviewed the major conclusions of the RAND
report, citing the reductions in the numbers of unidentified events
which might be achieved through rearrangement of the stations and ad-
dition of either four or nine new stations to the present twenty-one. Mr.
Lloyd said that a quota of four inspections would be justified if we were
to add 9 stations. Ambassador Wadsworth noted that we could expect
Soviet resistance to the addition of stations, although they may be will-
ing to accept such a departure from the Experts' report if this were the
price of a low quota figure.
    Mr. O'Neill suggested that it might be wise not to let the Soviets
know about the RAND recalculations and that we should not propose a
rearrangement or addition of stations until and unless we had reached a
final impasse on the quota figure. The first problem was to get the Soviet
reaction to our proposal for 20 inspections. Mr. Lloyd disagreed and
said that our dealings with Khrushchev would be helped if we gave him
all of the facts and figures. Otherwise we would succeed only in feeding
his suspicions. Mr. Farley noted that the report was in the public domain


    1 For text of the March 29 communique, issued at Camp David by President
Eisen-
hower and Prime Minister Macmillan, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents,
1960, pp. 734-735.
    2 For text of "Capabilities and Limitations of a Geneva Type Control
System," April
15, see U.S. Congress, 86th Session, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection
Controls of a
Nuclear Test Ban: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation,
pp. 99-101.