Preparations for the Summit Conference 361



say that, as a matter of tactics at the Summit, if in those discussions
Khrushchev attempts to declare that our rights are invalid our reaction
should be that under these circumstances it would be ridiculous to hold
a discussion of disarmament at the Summit. This is a different matter
from the question of our contingency planning which contemplates the
use of force to maintain our position if the Soviets actually physically
move against us in West Berlin.
    Dr. von Brentano agreed that the question of an interim agreement
should be further discussed in the larger meeting to follow the present
restricted meeting. He said that he believed all four agreed that an in-
terim agreement was acceptable, along the lines of the July 28 Geneva
proposal with some improvement, but that it was likewise recognized
that the setting of any time limit for it short of enduring until reunifica-
tion of Germany was very dangerous.
    Mr. Lloyd said that he had not thought the U.S. paper on Summit
purposes in any way altered the quadripartite paper on tactics which
had been agreed on in Washington5 from which he then read relevant
passages to which von Brentano nodded agreement. Mr. Lloyd then
noted that he understood the North Atlantic Council would be inter-
ested in discussing this question of an interim agreement.
    The Secretary observed that Couve de Murville would recall that at
the White House meeting with General de Gaulle6 it had been agreed
that all subjects discussed at the Summit would be inter-locking and that
there would be no agreement on any single item until the results of all
the discussions were available for incorporation in a comprehensive
communique.
    Dr. von Brentano then said that, if all agreed that the tactics paper
still stood unmodified, then his fears on our Summit purposes paper
disappeared.
    This was confirmed, with the Secretary noting that our Summit
purposes paper had been drafted several weeks ago primarily with a
view to placing a positive cast on our approach to the Summit.
    Couve de Murville then reverted to Dr. von Brentano's second
point. He said that he had never assumed that direct action by
Khrushchev against West Berlin would result only in our saying that
"this spoils the detente." (All agreed.)
    Couve de Murville said that, on von Brentano's first point, at Ge-
neva the four Western Powers had agreed to the proposal of July 28
which was contemplated for a stated period of years provided that at
the end of the period our rights remained unaffected. He asked if Dr.


    5See Document 115.
    6See Document 137.