550 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



estimate was that the Soviets had no intention of taking any such action
at this time. Surely we might have been expected to have seized this op-
portunity to go on to say that we of course had to assume that such plans
existed, that our troops in Berlin were constantly on the alert and would
effectively defend Berlin in the event the other side were so foolhardy as
to embark on such a venture.
    I am not suggesting that the West is in any position to wield a "big
stick", but I do suggest that too much caution causes many observers
in
Berlin to fear that the West may be operating under the misapprehen-
sion that major Soviet strategy is seriously influenced by so-called
"provocations" on our part. Sitting here in Berlin where nearly
every
week several incidents occur which could at any time be blown up to
serve as "provocations," one is impressed by the danger that Soviet
knowledge of our fear-to-provoke will stimulate rather than deter the
kind of move we seek to forestall.
    Recognition of this danger would lead to greater acceptance of the
second philosophy that I mentioned at the beginning of this letter. This
is the continuing, urgent need to impress upon Khrushchev and his fol-
lowers the fact that despite the U.S. election campaign, the sometimes
divisive interests of the Allied powers, the changing power relation-
ships in the world, etc. etc., the U.S. will go the limit to carry out its
pledges to stand by Berlin. Possibly the main deterrent to major Sov/
GDR harassment of our position in West Berlin and to other action de-
signed to produce a "solution" of the Berlin problem remains Soviet
respect for our strength of purpose here. Recent reports citing important
Soviet and GDR leaders as doubting our willingness to go all the way for
Berlin are alarming because if true they could lead to a tragic miscalcula-
tion. They point to the need right now to demonstrate that we are as de-
termined as ever and will defend Berlin whatever the cost.
    Many recent U.S. statements on Berlin have been favorably re-
ceived here (statements by both Presidential candidates, statements by
the Department's spokesman and notes to the Soviet Government). Un-
fortunately, the good effects of Linc White's recent statement,2 refuting
the East German blast about the Potsdam agreement were somewhat
offset in Berlin by the unfortunate impressions created by newspaper
stories out of Washington the same day claiming that State Department
officials believed Khrushchev was not bluffing when he warned he
would sign a separate peace treaty if the Bundestag should meet in Ber-
lin. (Why the hell we have to tell the world when we think Khrushchev is
bluffing and when he is not bluffing is a mystery to me.) However, I am
not really primarily concerned with Berlin reactions to U.S. policy but



2 For text of White's August 2 statement, see Dokumente, Band 5, 1960, p.
123.