Status of Berlin, August-December 1959 127



trend in American policy with respect to Berlin. I asked him what he
meant. He said that from reports he had of the Working Group increas-
ing emphasis seemed to be placed on the finding of a new status for
West Berlin. This in turn he deduced rested on the acceptance of the im-
probability of German reunification for the entire foreseeable future and
a consequent growing willingness to accept the status quo.
    I told him that I thought his fears were greatly exaggerated. I said
that it was true that reluctantly we had come to the conclusion during
the past year that reunification was not an imminent possibility. I said
that this belief had been forced on us largely by European opinion in-
cluding Germany. I also noted in passing that we still differed with the
Chancellor on the efficacy of the exertion of more influence toward the
East by the GFR through exchanges and other measures with the GDR
and through a more active policy with respect to Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia.
    I then turned to Berlin. I said the essential point was that we had not
thought under present circumstances or under any conceivable new ar-
rangement of withdrawing US forces from Berlin. This is the essential
protection of West Berlin and we will remain there as long as the situ-
ation requires and we are wanted. This being the case I said I thought
doubts and fears were totally unjustified.
    I went on to say that we saw two possible arrangements with re-
spect to Berlin. The first was an interim agreement with the Soviets on
the terms contained in our last offer at Geneva. This involved mainte-
nance unimpaired of our occupation rights. I said I did not think we
could consider going beyond the terms of our last Geneva offer with the
possible exception of accepting a modest reduction in allied forces if this
alone stood in the way of reaching this agreement. I pointed out that in
my view there was an important gain for all of us in the formulation
which was the clarification of the rights of civilian access. The second
possible approach I said was to find some new arrangement resting on a
basis other than occupation rights but retaining as its essential element
the presence of American troops in West Berlin. I said I thought we
would be derelict if all of us did not rack our brains to see if we could
find some such formula. For our own part I said we have not yet found
one, but we intend to continue to search since with the passage of further
time the validity of our occupation rights would come increasingly into
question before world public opinion. He noted and I agreed that the
effect of a change of status might be to create difficulty in securing a
re-
newal of the NATO guarantee. This I said would have to be assured in
advance.
    Finally I said that it seemed to us that at the Summit meeting Berlin
should be approached in the context of the discussion of German reuni-
fication and that it seemed logical to me that we should open the Summit