686 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



press would ask "What is going on in Germany?" or claim that things
were getting out of hand. While the French, the Netherlands and Bel-
gium, as well as Denmark, had helped Germany a little, the Federal Re-
public was still unable to carry out its requirements. One effect had been
to increase the price of facilities in Spain to a level which the Germans
could not now afford. The Spaniards had now said they were ready to
make available certain facilities, but not for explosives. The Germans
could stockpile food, medical supplies, blankets in Spain. The Spaniards
had also asked how granting these facilities could be combined with the
placing of contracts for weapons and ammunition in Spain. Sulzberger
of the New York Times, who obtained the original story about the Ger-
man-Spanish discussions, accordingly should get the credit for having
raised the market value of the Spanish facilities, Strauss commented.
    Strauss went on to say that he wanted to ask the moral and political
support of the US in having some of the WEU restrictions on Germany
modified. It was not a question of ABC weapons. He noted that, nine
months ago, the Germans had applied to have their allowable destroyer
tonnage raised from 3,000 to 5,000, since it was impossible to install a
suitable air defense (guided missile system) on vessels smaller than
4,000 tons. Without this air defense, operation of the destroyers in the
Baltic, which had been allocated to Germany by the NATO Command,
would be suicidal. Four German destroyers were under construction;
the other eight required to meet Germany's MC-707 force goals of
twelve would not be built unless the WEU limitation were changed.
Strauss said SACEUR should render a straight military judgment on the
necessity of any German request and leave the political consideration to
the WEU Council. He went on to criticize the fact that under the present
WEU arrangement SACEUR was in effect obtaining a political judg-
ment by the practice of a prior canvass of non-German WEU members.
In the case of the submarines, the UK had asked for a delay for an indefi-
nite period of time on the ground that it was undesirable to provoke So-
viet feelings before the Summit.
    The meeting in the Secretary's office adjourned at this point, and
Defense Minister Strauss and his party went to Room 5100 where dis-
cussion in a larger group, chaired by Mr. Merchant, was scheduled to
take place.8






    7Documentation on MC-70, NATO's long-range force goals plan, is in volume
VII,
Part 1.
    8See Document 260.