548 Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, Volume IX



    In the event of a Soviet turn-over to the GDR of all control functions
or access to Berlin, in the air as well as on the ground, I think we would
have every advantage of making a test in the air. It would offer by its
very nature, and based on the precedent of the Berlin blockade, the easi-
est "out" for the Soviets if they so desired. We would also have
the best
chance of winning an air battle in the event real resistance was encoun-
tered. By their very nature air operations are easier to control than
shooting engagements on the ground. It could therefore contain less
danger of automatic progression to general war than any ground en-
gagement. We could of course completely reserve our position in regard
to land communications and would not in any sense be committed
merely to a renewal of the air lift. However, since the problem is only
that of supplying the Western garrisons and not, as I understand it, that
of the civilian population in the opening phases of the crisis, we could
gain time while other world-wide measures could be developed and
put into effect. If blockades were extended to civilian traffic to Berlin,
we
could then on better basis initiate land probe.
    As to the technical feasibility of jets in the corridor, I am not compe-
tent to judge how limiting this factor is, but it should not be impossible
to fly air cover to a convoy of transports as a first move. In the event
of
armed resistance there would be no necessity or even desirability of
scrupulously respecting the limitations of the corridor since we would
have been subjected to an act of aggression.
    In any event, I would suggest that you should appoint a committee
at once to re-examine the various aspects of the contingency planning on
Berlin. If the Soviet attitude turns out to be mere bluff, we have only lost
a certain number of man hours in study, but we would be better pre-
pared to deal with a possible crisis this autumn.
    With further reference to Berlin, there have been some sugges-
tions current in the Department as to the best way of conveying to
Khrushchev a convincing demonstration of our determination in this
matter, particularly in light of the doubts he expressed in Austria to
Kreisky on this score. I doubt if a communication from the President to
Khrushchev would be the best method of doing this. In the first place, it
might be construed as a US initiative to open up the channel of personal
communication broken off by the Summit events. Secondly, it might af-
ford Khrushchev an opportunity while leaving the threat hanging to
cast an element of uncertainty in regard to his intentions which would
not help us very much. Thirdly, any written communication, particu-
larly in the present circumstances, would be considered by the Soviets to
have a propaganda angle which might reduce its effectiveness. On bal-
ance, if there is any continuing evidence of Soviet threats in regard to
Berlin, I believe an instruction to Thompson to talk to Khrushchev fol-
lowing his return to Moscow would be the best. He could either be