Preparations for the Summit Conference 341



5. General Disarmament.
    The importance of any Summit discussion of general disarmament,
on the other hand, will probably be its effect on world opinion. With this
in mind, we should emphasize that progress toward general disarma-
ment will have to go hand in hand with progress toward open societies.
While recognizing that this is for the Soviet Union to decide, we should
stress that support of closed societies hinders the achievement of disar-
mament.

                      Our Second Purpose:
         Deterring Communist Action Against Berlin and
         Paving the Way for an Eventual Acceptable Solution
6. The End in View.
    Our second major purpose at the Summit should be to seek an ar-
rangement-explicit or tacit-to preserve the existing situation in Berlin
for
a period of time. During this period we could try to progress toward a
more formal and definitive solution regarding Berlin.
7. The Means.
    To this end, we might seek either a temporary agreement or very gen-
eral Summit directive to a subordinate group, which would negotiate and report
back to Heads of Government. In this latter case, reciprocal declarations
to
avoid provocative actions, e.g., interference with unhindered communi-
cation to Berlin, might also be exchanged at the Summit, in an effort to
reduce tensions over Berlin during the period of negotiation that would
then lie ahead, without our trying to work out a formal agreement, with all
the attendant semantic and legal difficulties.
8.  Deterrent.
    Success in this effort to "de-fuse" Berlin would only be possible
if
we made clear the grave view that we would take of any Communist
action which threatened our access and purported to destroy our rights.
We should emphasize, at least privately to Khrushchev, that any such
action would seriously prejudice prospects for detente and for early disarma-
ment. The Soviets seem to set some store on pushing for detente and on
reducing their military burdens. They might prefer to have relaxation of
tensions with progress on arms control than to have their own way over
Berlin-if we made clear at a Summit that they could not have both.

                       Our Third Purpose:
An Increase in the Confidence and Cohesion of the Western Alliance
9. Our Goal.
    The Communists traditionally use any international encounter to
air their confidence in the ultimate triumph of their system. If they run