Federal Republic of Germany 685



strators could not be hired at a cheap price to march in the streets. He
could not predict what would happen in Germany if there were to be an
economic depression; hence the importance of continuous economic
growth.
    Strauss asked the Secretary whether he did not think that there
should be a branch of specialists in NATO, who understand Soviet psy-
chological warfare methods, to dissect slogans and to hit back in defense
of democracy. Every time the Federal Republic suggests such a project it
runs up against a rubber wall. The Secretary said he believed the De-
fense Minister had a real point. Only this morning under Tokyo dateline
he had read in the Herald Tribune an article suggesting that the demon-
strating students did not really know what the security treaty against
which they were demonstrating contained. Mr. Kohler noted that we
had tried a few things in this field and had not been particularly happy
about the results. Last week we had had a session with Secretary Gen-
eral Spaak with respect to NATO ten-year planning.4 The better coordi-
nation of informational and psychological defense policy would be an
element in our studies.
    Strauss said that the Germans had made a complete proposal in
NATO based on the idea of a special bureau to coordinate and evaluate
information and to provide answers. His recent experience in Canada
where he had made a tour of two weeks had shown him to what extent
Soviet slogans had penetrated even into Western countries. For exam-
ple, the Soviet anti-Nazi campaign, fifteen years after the end of the war,
had revived an issue which had little relationship to facts in Germany.
The real Nazis in the country amounted to less than one percent. The
greater danger was from a narrow-minded nationalism which saw its
future in greater contacts with the East or neutralism. He, therefore,
very much liked Couve's recent statement that Germany is in a key posi-
tion for European security.5 The concern of Chancellor Adenauer had
been to link Germany with the West within a greater framework. The
Germans wanted to be part of an institutional set-up going beyond
purely military goals. The Secretary commented that the Federal Re-
public had gone along with the community of six.
    Strauss noted that, with respect to integration of logistical support
within NATO, the Federal Republic had had great difficulty with the
Spanish affair.6 The Federal Republic was too small to meet its own lo-
gistical and training requirements. If it tried to do so, part of the British


    4Regarding Spaak's discussion with U.S. officials on June 13, see volume
VII, Part 1,
Document 183.
    5Not further identified.
    6Reference is to the talks between Spain and the Federal Republic of
Germany at the
end of 1959 and in 1960 concerning German use of Spanish training facilities,
supply de-
pots, and hospitals.